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3Introduction and thanks
I would like to give thanks to many individuals, without whose assistance, the words 
before you would not be committed to the page. First, I want to thank Dr. Bruce A. Rubenstein, 
of the Department o f History at the University of Michigan-Flint, for his patient and tireless 
oversight of this project, from dim idea to fully formed thesis. I would like to thank other 
professors, who at the time had no idea they were helping shape this work. These include, Dr. 
Jacqueline Zeff, Department o f English at University of Michigan-Flint, Dr. Charles Apple, 
Department of Communication, University of Michigan-Flint, and Dr. Derwin Munroe, 
Department of Political Science, University o f Michigan-Flint. I also want to thank Dr. Fredrick 
Svoboda, Department o f English, University of Michigan-Flint, for his assistance. Each of these 
fine scholars helped this work in ways difficult to categorize, but absolutely vital to the finished 
product. Each possesses a talent to explain and inspire, which is a gift to any student fortunate 
enough to have them as a professor. This list is not exhaustive, and I truly took something from 
each and every professor I was taught by, and to all of you, thank you for helping shape my 
approach to academic work.
The paper you hold in your hands is about a political figure who is quite divisive across 
the political spectrum. His name has become associated with a period and a style of behavior. 
Senator Joseph McCarthy, Republican from Wisconsin, has always held a fascination for me 
because so much has been written and otherwise said about him as a villain, or as a 
misunderstood hero, that I felt compelled to study him and his actions, for myself. As I 
approached the project, I made many o f the same assumptions others make, such as believing his
4involvement in Committees that he had no involvement in, and, as became clear during the 
process of research, how he was but one-if major-voice, representative of larger, recurring trends 
within American culture and society. I admit a certain bias in my initial approach, which was to 
show how and why McCarthy was never right. I had not counted on items of fact such as the 
Venona Decrypts, which when declassified in the late Twentieth-Century, proved that McCarthy, 
though his methods were far from pretty, and certainly not excusable, may have been on to 
something from time to time.
Instead, what emerged was the portrait o f a man and a nation emerging into the role of 
national and world leaders, struggling with ideas about isolation and responsibility and blinded 
by contradictory feelings of exceptionalism and inadequacy. There was hate, there was blame, 
and there was fear, panic, desire for power, ego, race, gender, constitutional violations, 
cowardice and bravery, on the parts of so many people from so many walks of life. I am not 
trying to reclaim Joseph McCarthy. That I will leave to those who are more politically and 
socially in line with him than I am. Instead, I hope to clear up many of the mistaken assumptions 
and block off the blind alleys that lead so many down rabbit holes. McCarthy, in this analysis, is 
part o f a post-World War Two trend with its historic roots reaching back to at least the First 
World War. This is a study in media and politics, and how one man used and was used by, those 
who make the news. It is about fear, panic and the dark underbelly o f American Culture.
5Chapter One: Background To A Menace
The term “McCarthyism” is a misnomer. Not only was the “McCarthy era" not begun by 
Republican Senator Joseph Raymond McCarthy of Wisconsin, it was not even the first Red 
Scare; moreover, neither his Senate sub-committee, which he did not chair until 1953, nor the 
House Un-American Activities Committee, were the first or only such bodies to exist. Following 
the 1917 Bolshevik takeover of Russia, western Capitalist nations, then in the midst of The Great 
War, became seized by an overwhelming fear that they would fall to a communist plot and cease 
to exist as they once had. This fear continued beyond the end of The Great War. In the United 
States, in the years immediately following The Great War, a panic set in among the people and 
government officials.
While fears, such as anxiety over the followers of labor leader Luigi Galleani, had existed 
prior to The Great War, it was not until the war had concluded that a real panic set in. Panics rely 
on fear, which rely on anxiety, and anxiety often relies on what is known and what is hidden, or 
secret. Such secrets “act like a Rorschach ink-blot...any qualities may be attributed to it, and no 
basis for refutation exists.”1 This is dangerous, creating an arena where opinion becomes as 
powerful as fact. Such secrets have other attributes, as well, including fostering a sense of 
community. Political hysteria works in insidious fashion.
A despised, deviant and dehumanized outgroup secretly plots the destruction of the good, 
fully human men and women who make up the true society. The Red conspirators of 
1919 were variously depicted as aliens, foreigners, Jews, vermin, lice, feces, disease, 
plague, epidemic, mad geniuses, scum, filth, rats, rodents, termites, snakes, criminals, 
idiots, anti-Christs, devils, sexually licentious, sadistic, perverse, and brutal...these 
attributes arouse feelings o f fear, hatred, disgust, dread and less obviously, feelings of 
envy. The functions of defining conspirators in these ways is to dehumanize them for the 
purpose of ‘legitimizing’ them as future victims, to ease the guilt that might ensue upon
1L evin . M urray B. P o litic a l H y ster ia  in A m erica : The D e m o cra tic  C a p a c ity  f o r  R epression . (N ew  York: B asic B ooks. 1971) 150
6their eliminations, and to mobilize the masses in support o f their extinction. The function
o f defining the outgroup as dangerous is to arouse anxiety.2
Such secrets and their resultant anxiety and rhetoric drove the Red Scares, both in the 
1950s and after the Great War. The first major investigatory body of the post-Great War period, 
dedicated to seeking out Communist influence, was the Overman Committee. Chaired by North 
Carolina Democratic Senator Lee Slater Overman, the committee existed between September 
1918, and June 1919, and consisted of five members. Joining Overman on his committee-which 
was never officially named-were four additional Senators: Knute Nelson, Republican from 
Minnesota; Josiah O. Wolcott, Democrat from Delaware; Thomas Sterling, Republican from 
South Dakota; and William H. King, Democrat from Utah. Importantly, the press became very 
involved with reporting the findings o f the body, which investigated suspected German and 
Bolshevik influences during the period of the United States involvement in The Great War.
The term “Witch Hunt” was used for the actions of the Overman Committee, and would 
be recycled in the 1950s. The term was applied during the testimony of Edward Everett Robbins, 
Republican congressman from Pennsylvania, in an exchange with Senator Sterling o f the 
Overman Committee. Robbins compared the current actions of the committee to those o f witch 
hunts in times past. Addressing Sterling, he said “you are familiar with the old witch-hunt 
attitude, that when people get frightened at things and see bogies, then they get out witch 
proclamations, and mob action and all kinds of hysteria takes place.”3 The media likes terms 
which inspire emotional responses, because such responses sell newspapers.
2L evin , 151
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7One such article, in the New York Times, dated February 17, 1919, concerned the 
centralization of industrial power in Russia. This was based on testimony to the Overman 
Committee by an unnamed witness, who was in charge of a factory in Russia at the time of the 
Revolution. In the testimony, the witness described the fear of the workingmen in Russia, who 
“are not Bolsheviki, although they do not dare to say they are something else."4The witness also 
described the violent means by which dissent was being put down in Russia, pleaded for 
understanding that the peasantry in Russia was by and large not Bolshevik, and hinted that 
American assistance would be welcome, by relating a story in which every peasant he 
encountered denied Bolshevism and became friendly upon learning he was an American 
Capitalist.5 This is propaganda at its finest, a report sprinkled with truth yet formulated to fit the 
demands o f the day. The Overman Committee took notice of such stories and used them as 
evidence in the righteousness of their investigations.
Witch Hunts stir up powerful images of the past, and yet, what is a witch hunt? The 
Overman committee was one, bent as it was on acting as a propaganda tool against Germany, 
with Bolshevism as a side-bar. Indeed, the newspapers and the Committee fed off one another, 
with the Committee “clearly supplementing the propaganda of employer groups and patriotic 
societies.. .a vital factor in the development of the Red Scare.. .with headlines such as “Red Peril 
Here” and references to Mad Russians and Reds as human scum.”6A witch hunt can be narrowly 
defined as a type of moral panic and under this definition, the Red Scares qualify. Yet, as with all
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8such panics, there would not have been concern if legitimate reasons did not at some point exist. 
The bombings o f 1919 and 1920 provided those reasons and more.
The Overman Committee was followed by the Lusk Committee, under the guidance of 
the New York legislature, and in operation from June 1919 to January 1920. Dedicated to active 
raiding of suspects, the Lusk committee was directed by Archibald Ewing Stevenson, and took 
place alongside the Palmer Raids. The raids were named after the Attorney General, Alexander 
Mitchell Palmer, who was frightened by the bombings Luigi Galleani had spearheaded, including 
one on June 2, 1919, which was detonated not far from where Palmer resided in Washington 
D.C, and which was the second attempt on his life, following one on May 1, 1919.7 The attack 
on Palmer was one of a sweeping attempt on government officials, including most of the 
Overman Committee.8 These attempts, over a period of several months, created distress among 
members of the government. There was inarguably a threat to national and personal security, 
with bombings occurring nationwide and not directed exclusively at government officials.
The bombings had mainly targeted those who objected to the right of workers to call a 
strike. After a period of investigation, Palmer, who was portrayed in the liberal media o f the time 
as a man who manipulated the government and media for his own aims, asked for nearly two 
million dollars from Congress, but received only $100,000. Palmer did so after going in front of 
Congress and declaring that the money would be used for investigations into:
Ultraradicals or Bolshevists or class-war agitators...we have received so many notices 
and got so much information that it has almost come to be accepted as fact that on a 
certain day, which we have been advised of, there will be another attempt to rise up and 
destroy the government in one fell swoop.9
?A vrich . Paul. S a cco  a n d  V anzetti: The A n a rch ist B ackgrou n d . (P rinceton. N ew  Jersey: Princeton  U niversity Press, 1991) 153
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9Palmer again addressed Congress, and stated that he was for stricter laws, and in favor o f 
an anti-sedition law for anarchists, a fact reflected in the New York Times, dated November 16, 
1919. That article, titled “Palmer for Stringent Laws5' outlined how Palmer had written a letter to 
Congress, proposing a law targeting “the IAW, Bolsheviki, Communists and other radical 
organizations and persons who are preaching through the spoken or printed word the overthrow^ 
o f the Government of the United States.”10 Perhaps Palmer’s conditions coming so soon after the 
end o f The Great War had something to do with how they were received.
The New York Times article continued, showing how Palmer had suggested that the 
results of his investigations “ .. .had listed, to date, more than 60,000 persons, practically all 
aliens, identified with anti-American and disloyal activities and a foundation for action under the 
deportation laws against the worst of these offenders.. 1 Because of this, Palmer drafted, at the 
request of Congress and based on these investigations, a law which proposed to define sedition in 
a new manner.
The law is to redefine sedition and the promotion thereof so as to make amenable to its 
penalties the organizations, individuals and publications which have been preaching 
anarchy, Bolshevism, and Communism and contains a section which would do away with 
the barriers now contained in the law which prevent the deportation of those convicted of 
anarchy.12
In June of 1919, Palmer began to restructure the Justice Department. Toward that end, 
Palmer worked with J. Edgar Hoover, whom he named to head the Justice Department’s Bureau 
of Investigation in August of 1919. That same month, the journalist John Reed, along with his 
compatriots Benjamin Gitlow and William B. Lloyd, founded a nativist branch of the
10N e w  York T im es. N ovem b er  16, 1919. "Palm er for Stringent L aw s"http://querv.n v tin ies.com /m em /arch ive-
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Communist Party of the United States, only months after that party’s founding. In spite of their 
radicalism, the three men did this because they were “naturally suspicious of the alien-dominated 
language of federations and feared that their own brand of native radicalism would be 
subverted.” 13O f the bombings, Reed believed “they were planted by some reactionary who 
wanted to terrify the “ruling class” into destroying the radical labor movement in this 
country.” 14Hoover, meanwhile, had been busy while head of the Radical Division, which would 
have kept a close watch on such developments.
In early 1919, John Reed had published his account of the Bolshevik Uprising, Ten Days 
that Shook the World. When asked about his feelings towards revolution, Reed told a reporter “I 
have always wanted a Revolution in the United States. ..Revolution does not necessarily mean a 
revolution by force. By revolution, I mean profound social change.” 15 Men like Hoover and 
Palmer, like Overman and Lusk, did not care to hear about change to the status quo. Those who 
hold power are never eager to relinquish it. Politics being a struggle and disagreement about 
determining who gets what, where, when and how much, there is always resistance to such 
change, particularly massive social upheaval. The same would happen during the early 1950s, 
because man does not change his nature in a matter o f decades. Reed died in Russia a year later.
Clearly, there was a thread o f radicalism afoot. As head of the Radical Division:
Hoover had directed the compilation of files on over 200,000 groups and individuals. The 
files principally contained information on Communist targets, but also included reports 
on prominent liberals (for example, Jane Addams and Robert La Folette) and liberal 
organizations (such as the American Civil Liberties Union).16
13M urray, 51
147 9 -8 0 , M urray
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16M a cD o n n e ll. F rancis In sid iou s F oes: The A xis F ifth -C olum n a n d  the A m erican  H om efront. (N ew  York: O xford U n iversity  Press. 1995) 161
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Hoover, armed with this knowledge, chose to view the agreement of the Labor 
Department to act against the Communist Party to be one which included as a target The 
Communist Labor Party. The difficulty for Hoover and Palmer was that Secretary o f Labor 
William B. Wilson claimed Hoover must prove more than merely membership in an organization 
before a warrant could be issued. Hoover found compliant allies within the Labor department 
and got his warrants, later denying, as did Palmer and his people, any such requirements had 
been made known to them .17 Palmer was seen as weak by those who claimed he did not, in the 
end, pursue the bombers far enough. His “Soviet Ark”-real name The Buford-of December 1919, 
was considered a publicity stunt.
Among hundreds of deportees, The Buford carried Emma Goldman, whose “notoriety 
had begun in 1893 and over the following twenty-five years she had been arrested many times 
for making speeches ‘menacing to the public order.’18 A movement to deport Goldman, however, 
had existed “since 1907... it was claimed she was actually the mentor o f Leon Czolgosz, the 
assassin o f McKinley.”19 Goldman was but one of several prominent names aboard the ship, 
which was seen as sending its passengers back to where they belonged, the thinking being 
radicals were foreigners and foreigners were radicals, and radicals were Communists and 
Communists were Russian. This was a highly flawed ill-logic, but in the climate o f the period, 
even those who were not Russian, and had been bom and raised in the United States, were 
among those being shipped to “mother Russia.” Yet, it was not The Buford which tipped the 
scales against Palmer.
17M urray.2 2 3 -2 2 4
18M urray. 207
|,; ibid
In an action criticized by many within Justice Department, Palmer allowed Galleani and 
eight of his associates to exit the country, following a simple conversation between themselves 
and Federal agents, at the East Boston immigration center, where the men admitted to being 
anarchists.20 As a result, Palmer found himself fading in power and popularity. Additionally, 
there was the trouble over Hoover's actions, less sympathetic men at Labor, including Louis 
Freeland Post, and harsh press coverage by liberal-leaning magazines like The Nation and The 
New Republic.
Post in particular played a vital role, by applying the decision o f Supreme Court Justice 
Oliver Wendell Holmes in Silverthorne Lumber Company v. US, where information gathered on 
the basis o f the illegal seizure o f papers and files could not thereafter be used to incriminate a 
defendant.21 Post was a devout “believer in freedom of speech and assemblage.”22Acting on 
those beliefs, what concerned Post most was both the lack o f proper counsel, and the political 
illiteracy, o f many of the aliens under warrant. As a result, Post “refused to throw all anarchists, 
whether terroristic or pacifistic, into the same pile.,,23Post made enemies through these actions.
On May 1, 1920, a resolution was offered, in the House, to censure Post, and on May 7, 
Post testified before the House. There, Post “defended his 1239 cancellation of warrants which 
he had already ordered and concluded his remarks by roundly assailing the Department of Justice 
for its high-handed procedures and illegal actions.”24 His eloquence and literacy in explaining his 
actions and admonishing the Rules Committee, that “all agreed the Rules Committee ought to 
make a graceful withdrawal.. .they looked much like a person who had picked up a hot poker and
20A vrich , 168
21M urray, 247
22 ibid
23 ibid
24M urray, 249
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was trying to find a place to put it.”25The deportation o f communists and anarchists faded in 
importance for the government, even though the threat of bombings would remain into the 
1930s. Post died in 1928, unpopular among conservatives. Palmer, who returned to practicing 
law in 1921, died in 1936, his career unrecovered following the raids that bore his name.
In the 1930s, another wave of anti-Communist feeling began to spread, and it was 
Congressman Hamilton Fish III who introduced a bill on May 5, 1930, to establish a committee 
to investigate Communist activities inside the United States. Its chief target at the time was 
Communist Party USA leader William Z. Foster.26Fish also wrote an article, for The Annals, in 
which he began by stating that:
Communism is the most important, the most vital, and the most far-reaching issue in the 
world, affecting the civilization of the world and the happiness and safety of our people. 
The merits and the demerits of prohibition sink into insignificance compared to this 
question o f Communism, whose ramifications reach into every human sphere and 
activity, and which is a great world issue. It may be divided into three parts: the 
revolutionary or political, the moral or religious, and the economic.27
These sentiments reflected the concerns and beliefs of anti-Communists o f the period, 
and would carry over into the period o f Senator McCarthy. On May 26, 1938, the Fish 
Committee and the McCormack-Dickstein Committee, were combined and reorganized into the 
House Un-American Activities Committee. It was known at first as the Dies Committee because 
its chair was Martin Dies, Democrat from Texas. This body was charged with broad powers to 
investigate allegations o f disloyalty or subversion on the part o f private citizens and government 
employees alike, as well as any businesses or organizations suspected of acting as communist or
2f M urray, 24 9
2hFish jr. H am ilton. H am ilton  F ish: M em o ir  o f  an  A m erican  P a trio t. (C hicago: R egenery publish ing. 1991)42
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fascist fronts. Even those simply suspected o f having communist or fascist ties were placed 
under scrutiny. HU A C’s intentions seem to be guided by the principles laid out by Fish.
In 1939, two books were published which helped increase unease over the threat of 
Communism. Both can be positioned within the sub-fear of The Fifth Column, a concept which 
came into existence in 1936, during the Spanish Civil War, and which had much in common with 
the claims made by Fish. The Fifth Column was described thusly “first used by General Emilio 
de Mola, who had announced that a fifth column was making ready to erupt from within the 
capital city of M ardid...foreign agents, domestic traitors and enemy dupes would form the 
backbone.”28 Further, it would use a variety of tactics, including “espionage, sabotage, and 
subversion in order to leave its host country demoralized, divided and militarily unprepared for 
war.”29The practical applications gave immediacy to the threat, which meant that “in the event of 
an actual invasion, Trojan Horse operatives would assist the enemies’ regular troops.”30 Fears of 
hidden threats work wonders in keeping voters just nervous enough that they do not notice 
encroachments on their civil rights. The two publications, both reflecting these fears, supported 
those efforts.
The first book, written by Soviet defector Walter Krivitsky, was titled In S ta lin ’s Secret 
Service. Originally serialized in the Saturday Evening P ost the book warned of “Soviet intrigue 
in Europe and Am erica.. .OGPU murders outside the Soviet Union, Comintern plots in Germany 
and attempts by Stalinist agents to pass counterfeit bills in the United States.”31 Krivitsky was 
not finished, and increased the level of fear by stating that “the Communist Party o f the United
28M a cD o n n e ll, 3
Ibid
w ibid
11 M a cD o n n e ll. 77
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States was more closely aligned than any other with our OGPU and Intelligence Service., .many 
members o f CPUS A engaged in espionage for the Soviet Union .”32The news seemed so horrible 
it had to be true.
Jan Valtin released the second of the two books, in 1939. Out o f  the Night ended with 
Valtin “fleeing the secret police o f both Germany and the Soviet Union, a final which 
underscored the popular notion that Stalinism and Hitlerism were two sides o f the same 
coin.”33In his book, Valtin detailed his capture, torture and turn into a double-agent by the Nazis, 
as well as his w ife’s murder and son’s disappearance.34A review in Time magazine stated that 
the book showed “the Russian Fifth Column is coterminous with the globe.”35As Europe became 
engulfed in War, the United States plodded along, worrying about infiltrators and its own sunken 
economy.
Within this framework, Martin Dies decided the most important security concern facing 
The United States was The New Deal. In 1939, Dies released a statement. In it, he asserted that 
“over 2,850 known Communists held government employment positions.. ..made it clear he 
believed the White House coddled Communists... and charged Secretary of Labor Frances 
Perkins with indifference.”36 Dies placed his weight behind a cut in funding to the Federal 
Theater and Writer’s Projects, “WPA programs in which Communists were involved.”37In 1940, 
with concerns growing, Congress passed the Alien Registration Act, known as the Smith Act.
12 ibid
''M a cD o n n e ll, 78
34M a cD o n n e ll, 78
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36M a cD o n n e ll, 79
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Dies influenced this legislation, which “made it a crime to advocate, abet, advise, or teach 
the duty, necessity, desirability or propriety o f destroying any government in the United States 
by force or violence” while the Alien Registration Act “made membership in a revolutionary 
group a punishable offense, thus preventing the government from having to prove individual 
violations of the law.”38With such acts on the books, the United States was preparing itself for a 
new political reality.
During The Second World War, HU AC remained occupied with hearings. Chairman 
Martin Dies released periodic reports. Dies, typically a hands off sort, aside from the Smith Act, 
was noted for never appearing at the few public hearings he arranged, but had published a report 
in 1944 “listing 245 Communist- Front Organizations and 344 pages o f the names of people 
(more than 20,000) who had signed petitions, sponsored organizations or appeared on 
letterheads.”39 This was ample proof that “McCarthy era” fear o f communism was not something 
cooked up by the Wisconsin Senator but already present within American society.
The Dies Committee, with its reports, pointedly targeted “the CIO, CIO Political Action 
Committee (CIO-PAC) Union for Democratic Action and ‘Communist sympathizers’ in the 
Roosevelt administration.”40 Dies targets were wide, and included “Eleanor Roosevelt, whose 
name appeared on the list 20 tim es.. .the Office of Price Administration, Federal 
Communications Commission, Office of Civilian Defense, and Board of Economic Welfare.”41 
Dies also suggested that “Security risks were employed in those agencies and departments” 
while “conservatives in the House of Representatives mounted a campaign to deny salaries to
38M a cD o n n e ll. 7 9 -8 0
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those people named by Dies.”42 As the result of such pressure, Franklin Roosevelt issued an 
Executive Order “setting up an interdepartmental committee to handle complaints of subversive 
activity, with the Democrats in the House moving to establish a committee of the Appropriation 
Committee to do likewise.” “Red Fear” and Red Baiting” were neither the exclusive domain of 
either party, nor were they limited to a specific place and time in American history.
In 1945, twenty-six years after the initial “Red Scare” HU AC became a permanent 
committee, a position it would hold until its dissolution in 1975. This status occurred after 
Martin Dies decided not to run for re-election in 1944, and HU AC “was transformed in a smooth 
parliamentary maneuver by John E. Rankin of Mississippi... with broad investigatory 
powers.”43After World War II, Rankin “wanted to find out whether the Communists are still 
planning to destroy or overthrow the American system of government.”44 The Second World 
War was over, but the Cold War had begun, with the soon-to-be disgraced John Parnell Thomas 
assuming chairmanship o f HUAC.
It was then that the involvement of Senator McCarthy in anticommunist activities became 
possible, as the people known as the Hollywood Ten and the Whitaker Chambers/Alger Hiss 
case, rose to prominence in 1947 and 1948, respectively. It can be assumed without stretching 
credulity that McCarthy took notice of the attention lavished on these cases, and as a new 
member of the Senate, wanted to make his mark. Any politician worth his salt would have 
latched onto a security-plus-patriotism issue in the glow of victory following the Second World
42C eplair, 6 5 -6 6
43G add is, John L ew is, U nited  States, and the O rigins o f  the C old  War. The: 1941-1947 . (N ew  York: C o lu m b ia  U niversity Press. 1972) 258
44 ibid
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War. McCarthy simply became the most vocal anti-Communist member of the Senate and 
certainly more strongly than either Thomas or Dies had from the House.
In the case o f the “Hollywood Ten”, the W aldorf Statement, released on November 1947 
by Motion Picture Association of America president Eric Johnson, effectively ended the 
employability o f not just the ten people named, including Ring Lardner Jr, Dalton Trumbo, 
Herbert Biberman and Edward Dmytryk, but affirmed the earlier statement by Johnson that he 
would never “employ any proven or admitted Communist because they are just a disruptive force 
and I don't want them around.”45 This was important because it was an officially stated position 
affecting employment not in matters of state security, but in matters of entertainment. The 
argument was about denying the persuasive power of film to those with non-capitalist leanings, 
anarchist bents or, simply, those who did not conform to popular social and economic beliefs of 
the period.
In 1972, Dorothy B. Jones released a study of the Hollywood Ten, in which she searched 
for evidence of Communism in their filmed works. In “a survey of 159 movies released between 
1929 and 1949, in which the Hollywood Ten had credits. ...31 percent dealt with themes of 
‘social significance’, a proportion high compared to the industry’s output as a whole.”46 Of direct 
Communist propaganda, Jones concluded “there is none.”47Yet among the Ten themselves, 
timidity was not the order of the day.
Dalton Trumbo lashed out in the Daily Worker against renegades like John Dos Passos, 
Arthur Koestler and James T. Farrell, and snarled that the “non-Communist Left" had 
become the non-anti-Fascist Left. He also claimed that 3.5 million Jews lived in the 
Soviet Union ‘under the protection of laws which ban discrimination o f any kind.' When 
Albert Maltz, another of the Ten, dared to suggest in print that a politically committed
45D ick , Bernard F. R a d ic a l Innocence: A C r it ic a l S tu dy  o f  the H o lly w o o d  Ten. (L exington: U niversity  Press o f  K entucky. 1989) 7
46C aute, D avid. G rea t F ear. The: The A n ti-C om m u n ist p u r g e  u n der Trum an a n d  E isenh ow er. (N ew  York: S im on  & Schuster, 1978) 401
47ibid
19
work of art ought to be first and foremost a work of art, he was tom limb from limb for 
his heresy by Dalton Trumbo, Herbert Biberman, Howard Fast and John Howard 
Lawson: Maltz duly recanted.48
In addition to control, Communism in Hollywood was about belonging to a group and 
about ego, factors the media o f the day did not widely cover because it did not attract the desired 
circulation. When Dmytryk testified before HUAC, he said that in Hollywood
a successful person will never say, I got there by hard work and personality. He will say 
‘I got the breaks.’ There is such a lingering feeling that their success is not 
deserved.. .they look around for some organization that will validate them. The party lays 
very clever flytraps.49
Those egos were the same ones with which the Communist Party of the United States had 
a tenuous relationship, describing treatment of The Ten as ‘Torture by inquisition’ yet 
considering them to be “posturing beneficiaries o f bourgeois entertainment.’00 There was a 
disconnection between the every-day and Hollywood, and between the hardcore ideologues 
within the CPA and the members o f The Ten.
When Dalton Trumbo complained to fellow blacklisted writer John Bright that he had 
lost his ability to earn, and quoted a seven-figure loss, Bright admonished Trumbo. “it is deeply 
immoral to moum the loss...it is ideological corruption.”51 Bright continued, stating Hollywood 
blacklistees “had subverted art and honesty by selling the status quo. Their political activity 
derived in large part from a recognition of their guilt. And then they wept when they were 
deprived, not o f bread and milk, but of Cadillacs and minks.”52 A great illustration of how petty
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the concerns of blacklisted writers were compared to the lives of those living under Stalinist 
edicts in Russia is the case o f Vsevolod Meyerhold.
Vsevolod Meyerhold, one of the great innovators of Russian theater, with his stylized and 
abstract productions, was accused o f mysticism and neglect of socialist realism. In 1938, 
his theater was ‘liquidated’ as ‘alien to Soviet art’ and on June 15, 1939, he was invited 
to criticize himself at a convention of theater directors presided over by the prosecutor of 
the purges, Andrei Vyshinsky. Meyerhold said: ‘The pitiful and wretched thing that 
pretends to the title o f the theater o f socialist realism has nothing in common with 
art....everything is gloomily well regulated...and murderous in its lack of talent...you have 
done something monstrous...in hunting down formalism, you have eliminated art!’ 
Meyerhold, a man of sixty-five, was arrested and tortured. His interrogator, B.V. Rodus, 
broke his left arm and urinated in his mouth. Meyerhold wrote Vyshinsky that, though 
one arm was broken, he could still use a pen with the other. On February 2, 1940, he was 
shot.53
The lack of understanding and context on both left and right sides of the political 
spectrum is staggering. Both sides were all too eager to prove they were correct. The press, films 
and radio were all too willing to oblige them. As with religion, there were true believers on both 
sides. The loss o f men like Meyerhold is the sort o f story which demonstrates, for men like 
McCarthy, why Communism had to be resisted, and for the Hollywood Ten, why they were 
victims o f their own egos. It was often ego and self-preservation, which played roles in being 
pro-or anti-Communism. In order to protect themselves, men and women fell upon one another, 
and few cases illustrate such backstabbing as clearly as the Whittaker Chambers/Alger Hiss 
trials.
On August 3, 1948, Whittaker Chambers, who had initially gone to the government in 
1939 to tell them, to no avail, o f communist infiltration, informed HUAC that Alger Hiss, while 
employed by the State Department, had been a Communist, though unlike Chambers, uninvolved 
in direct espionage. Hiss denied involvement. Yet, Chambers also told HUAC. in a panel that
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included future United States President Richard M. Nixon, then a Representative from 
California, that during the 1930s, he had been a member o f “a cell of seven m en...the other 
members were Lee Pressman, Alger Hiss, Donald Hiss, Victor Perlo, Charles Kramer"54 and 
stated that Kramer’s true identity was “Krivitsky.. .and there was also John Abt and Henry 
Collins. Harold Ware was the organizer.”33 In testimony at his first trial, Alger Hiss, questioned 
about Ware, denied knowing if any o f the men were Communists. “I knew Harold Ware to the 
extent that I testified to in 1933 or 1945. It was not my practice then to ask people whom I met 
casually whether they were Communists.”56 Chambers later wrote in his memoirs o f how he had 
tried to get Hiss noticed in 1939, and been rebuffed.
Chambers wrote that “in August 1948, Adolf A. Berle testified before the House 
Committee on Un-American Activities, not long after my original testimony about Alger Hiss 
and the Ware Group.”57 It had been Berle to whom Chambers had gone in 1939 with the 
information about Hiss. Chambers recounted that “his memory had grown dim .. .he had been 
unable to take seriously, in 1939, any idea that the Hiss boys and Nat Wit were going to take 
over the Government.”38 Chambers seemed bemused by this, and noted that while “the word 
espionage was never mentioned... when (Berle’s notes) were taken out of a secret file and turned 
over to the FBI... Berle himself had headed them Underground Espionage Agent. ”59 The Hiss 
case dragged, featuring claims and counterclaims, until December 1948.
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On December 2, 1948, Chambers led investigators from HUAC to a pumpkin on his 
property, and withdrew 35mm film, placed there by him the day before, which implicated 
himself and Hiss. 60 Chambers, editor in chief o f Time magazine, came under intense scrutiny by 
the media. Columnist Walter Winchell wrote “gee, Whittaker! Time Marxes on...imagine, Time 
was edited all these years by Whittaker Chambers, self-confessed Communist, accused perjurer, 
and Russian spy!”61 A federal grand jury indicted Hiss on two counts of perjury, but Chambers, 
who admitted to the same offense, was granted immunity for his role as a cooperating 
government witness. The first trial ended in a hung jury. A second trial convicted Hiss on two 
counts o f perjury, for which, in January 1950, he was given two concurrent five-year sentences, 
o f which he served nearly four. As the 1940s ended, two more cases of Communist infiltration 
had emerged, causing further concerns, outrage and questions:
In 1949, news stories revealed that Justice Department employee Judith Coplon gave 
secret FBI materials to a Soviet official. Early in 1950, the FBI arrested Harry Gold and 
David Greenglass for passing atomic secrets to the Soviets. Greenglass told the Bureau 
that he had been recruited into espionage by his brother-in-law Julius Rosenberg. In July 
1950, the government arrested Julius and Ethel Rosenberg. After a highly publicized trial 
the two were found guilty. In 1953, the couple received the death penalty. While 
historians still debate the legitimacy of the Hiss and Rosenberg verdicts, the reality of 
Soviet espionage is beyond dispute.62
In the examples o f The Hollywood Ten, The Rosenbergs and Hiss/Chambers, the 
swirling accusations closely mirrored what later came with Senator McCarthy, and played a role 
in illustrating how radio, print and film were used on both sides of the issue. There was a spirit of 
gleeful publicity, or sensationalism, “in bringing the Hiss-Chambers story to light and in 
publicizing it in sensational fashion, the House committee was obligated as an arm of the
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American Congress to do more than it did.”63 The specialized climate of political, economic and 
social anxiety which existed in the post-World War Two era, despite the Allied victories over 
Germany and Japan, solidified around the emergence of Russia, The Allies mistrusted co-victors 
in the war, as well as China becoming a Communist state and a seeming stalemate in Korea.
What Congress did, within these conditions, was “to be content to stress only the sordid 
side o f the story... encouraged the irresponsible wave of Red-Hunting and of loyalty-impugning 
that was to culminate in 1950 in the shocking and dangerous tactics of Senator McCarthy.”64 The 
correct, or at least calmer path-its security is questionable-might have been to:
be content in exposing Alger H iss’s wrongdoing.. .unique that he alone among the young 
men of promise in the late thirties were beginning to rise to important posts in the 
government could have been corrupted by Communist agents such as Whittaker 
Chambers?65
Sensationalism, grandstanding and fear ruled the day. As Murray Levin writes “the 
Democratic capacity for repression is subtle and deeply rooted and, for it to flower in America, 
extreme economic hardship is not necessary.”66Senator McCarthy, with a willing media, was 
about to take full advantage of that climate offered him.
On February 9, 1950, speaking before the Women’s Republican club of Wheeling, West 
Virginia, he stitched together from various sources a general attack on the 
administration’s security policies, and declared: ‘In my opinion the State Department, 
which is one of the most important government departments, is thoroughly infested with 
Communists.’ The Senator claimed he had a list o f 205 or 57 names-how many remains a 
matter of dispute-of Communist Party members who were still State Department 
employees. In the atmosphere of this period, McCarthy’s attack caught on and he pursued
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it for all its political value. Stephen J. Spingam later recalled that M cCarthy's charges 
‘caused special trepidations through the entire government of the United States.'67
McCarthy did not begin the post-War anti-Communist movement which would one day 
bear his name, but, for good or ill, he was going to become its face and its voice. He would be 
scrutinized like few other politicians of his time and as much as he was responsible for his own 
actions, he is also partially a product of his period, in large part because of media coverage, “the 
Mass Media helped keep the panic going. Many newspaper editors and reporters expressed scorn 
for Joseph McCarthy. Nonetheless, the press gave extensive coverage to McCarthy’s accusations 
and failed to follow up properly his more outrageous charges.”68 At the same time, films about 
Communism grew in popularity. “The Communist Trojan Horse also became an important theme 
for radio shows, comic books, and pulp novels of the period. In fact, long after the McCarthy era 
had passed, many works of popular culture still based their storylines on the idea of a Red Fifth 
Column.”69In this social and political atmosphere, Joseph McCarthy ascended, giving form to a 
renewed, post-War sense of patriotism.
As the 1950s began, America faced a very different world from even the one that had 
emerged out of the Second World War. China’s transformation to Communism, combined with 
the Truman administration’s commitment to the ideas of Containment, through involvement in 
Korea, and financial aid to the Mediterranean, created a new and constraining framework for 
which politicians to work in. The scholar John Lewis Gaddis writes that:
By presenting aid to Greece and Turkey in terms of an ideological conflict between two 
ways of life, Washington officials encouraged a simplistic view of the Cold War which 
was, in time, to imprison American diplomacy in an ideological straitjacket almost as 
confining as that which restricted Soviet foreign policy. Trapped in their own rhetoric.
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leaders of the United States found it difficult to respond to conciliatory gestures which 
emanated from the Kremlin following Stalin’s death and, through their inflexibility, may 
well have contributed to the perpetuation of the Cold War.70
In this context, McCarthy was not a creator, but a leader and a follower, placed into a 
system with a long history and which was becoming more intractable by the day, in a media 
fueled frenzy that demanded the most sensational results. The events of the late 1940's had 
proven a fertile ground for sowing seeds of mistrust. The time was "right” for a man like 
McCarthy to emerge.
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Chapter Two: Owen Lattimore and The Demands o f Evidence
The accusations leveled by Republican Senator Joseph McCarthy of Wisconsin against 
Owen Lattimore, an until-then-somewhat-obscure expert on East Asian matters, did not exist in a 
vacuum. As the 1940s ended, the administration o f President Harry Truman came under intense 
scrutiny for being soft on Communism. The scholar Earle Latham contended that “McCarthyism 
was the function o f a conservative drive for power which, frustrated by the reelection of Harry S. 
Truman in 1948, asserted itself through the legislative branch.”71 In January 1949, Truman 
remarked on the rise of Red-Hysteria among Republicans, a party that had seen many losses 
since the mid-1930s, as being linked to “the hysteria-mongering branch of the Republican 
party .. .the brains o f this anti-Red movement” and named as perpetrators of this trend Karl 
Mundt and Richard Nixon, in the House, and Homer Ferguson in the Senate.72
White House Security aid Stephen Spingam presciently noted in January 1950 that “a 
crusade or holy war entirely devoted to attacking Communism.. .the holy war type of fight tends 
to make the single policy of anti-Communism the test o f American patriotism.”73 As the 1950s 
began, McCarthy was not the only prominent anti-Communist voice, because “many right wing 
republicans were saying the same thing (charges about Truman harboring communists) but none 
with the same skill in making use of the press.”74 Mindful of consequences for their careers “ 
Reporters had to report what a prominent and controversial senator said, but unfortunately their
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efforts to find out if  there was any substance in what he charged lagged far behind the damming 
charges themselves.”7:) The press cannot be held wholly responsible for this development.
McCarthy persisted because “it was not the constitutional immunities which adhered to 
office of the United States Senator, but because o f the political immunities which he gained by 
identification with the Communist issue.”76 By being a populist, McCarthy was able to shield 
himself behind a reservoir o f mass support. Starting with his speech in Wheeling, West Virginia 
in February 1950, and ending with his censure by the Senate in 1954, McCarthy was the most 
prominent anti-Communist voice in the government of the United States.
Yet, his personal charge of a committee lasted only from 1953 until 1954. Media 
portrayal would have one believe that not only was he in charge of HU AC itself, and chaired it 
from its beginnings in 1938, but also that he lasted there until its demise in 1975. Being a 
senator, he could not possibly have served on a House, or Congressional, committee. McCarthy’s 
death from hepatitis, likely caused by alcoholism, in 1957, puts the notion to rest that he served 
until 1975.
Perception, however, is often more potent than reality, and reality is not as compelling a 
case of propaganda as misinformation, a fact well understood by both McCarthy and his critics.
In order to understand this, one must understand the relationship between McCarthy and the 
media, and how the media portrayed Communism and anti-Communism. His first national 
televised appearance was during:
The Tyding’s subcommittee investigation of charges made by him at Wheeling and on
February, 20, 1950 when he talked of ’81 cases’ on the Senate floor. These hearings had
begun on March 8 and were broadcast April, 7, 1950 by NBC and CBS on the occasion
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of testimony by Owen Lattimore, a consultant on far eastern affairs whom McCarthy had 
called ‘the top Soviet agent’ in the United States. The fact that the hearing was televised 
was unusual enough to warrant a two page column in the New York Times.77
The case of Owen Lattimore began when McCarthy was asked for details about the 
accusations he made o f the State Department, in Wheeling, West Virginia on February 9, 1950.
It was shortly after, when pressed at an appearance before the newly created Subcommittee on 
the Investigation o f Loyalty o f State Department Employees, chaired by Democratic Senator 
Millard Tydings o f Maryland, that McCarthy “fingered China expert Lattimore and three others, 
including a former U.S. Navy commander and his wife.”78 Lattimore’s time at the Institute for 
Pacific Relations, or IPR, and his associations stemming from that employment, were a source of 
many of the accusations made against Lattimore by both McCarthy and other anti-Communists.
Lattimore had served during World War Two “as the American government’s liaison 
with Chiang-Kai-shek and then headed the Office o f War Information’s Pacific operations. He 
had never worked for the State Department.”79 Yet by 1941 “Lattimore, who like most o f his 
fellow China experts, had few illusions of Chiang-Kai-shek’s corrupt and undemocratic regime 
found that his left o f center politics attracted the FBI’s attention.. .but never found anything on 
him.”80 The arguments in American government over how to handle the rebellion in China 
between Communist rebels in Yenan and government led by Chiang-Kai-shek, would form the 
core o f McCarthy’s attacks not just against Lattimore but nearly every accused who came into 
his orbit.
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Lattimore, hired by the IPR in 1934, also became editor-in-chief o f its magazine, Pacific 
Affairs, that same year. In 1988, a Chinese Communist operative named Chen Han-Shen, 
working through Russian channels, divulged how in 1936 “his supervisors dispatched him to the 
United States to serve as Lattimore’s co-editor at Pacific Affairs, at Lattimore’s personal 
request.”81 This is astonishing, because it contradicts much of what Lattimore said. Yet, this is 
not all. “Chen used his position to carry out espionage activities in New Y ork.. .but did not tell 
Lattimore he was working for Chinese intelligence or inform him of his own clandestine 
activities.”82 This is likely, yet Lattimore had requested Chen through Commintem-the 
communist network-and could not have been oblivious to his leanings. “Historians Ronald 
Radosh and Harvey Kleher conclude of Lattimore that ‘if he was not actually a Communist, he 
was certainly an opportunist.”83 Therefore, one view of Lattimore is that:
Lattimore’s sin was that he had seen, correctly estimated, and politely but firmly warned 
about, Communist strength in Asia; his advice-to relieve Asians of tyranny and 
corruption by backing liberal independence movements-had sometimes been asked by 
Washington but rarely acted upon.84
Another view of Lattimore is that he “was a conscious and articulate instrument of 
Stalinism .. .that used his reputation as a scholar to disguise his real agenda and when the game 
was up, surrounded himself with trusting and gullible colleagues.”83 Regardless, the Owen 
Lattimore case further gained notoriety in March of 1950. Headlines began appearing in 
newspapers, such as how “on Monday, March 13, 1950, an inch-high banner headline screamed 
across the front page of the Baltimore Evening Sun: MCCARTHY CITES LATTIMORE,
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THREE OTHERS AS PRO RED.”86 The next few weeks were filled with tension, as a reply was 
awaited from Lattimore. As scholar Joanne Cavanaugh Simpson explains
Owen Lattimore, then director of Hopkins’s Walter Hines Page School of International 
Relations, was in Afghanistan on a special United Nations mission to offer technical and 
economic aid to that country. Flying first to Peshawar, Pakistan, and then motoring to 
Kabul, he had been out o f touch for weeks. On March, 24, an Afghan messenger stepped 
out o f the cold into a crowed, smoky room. He carried a telegram from the Associated 
Press. By that time, Republic Senator Joseph R. McCarthy had escalated his charge: in a 
leak to the press, McCarthy named Lattimore the Soviet Union’s top espionage agent in 
the United States, staking his whole anti-communist crusade on Lattimore’s guilt. 
Lattimore’s blunt response to the Senator’s charges: ‘moonshine.’ ‘McCarthy’s off record 
ranting pure moonshine-stop, ‘ Lattimore wrote in a cable to the AP. ‘Delighted his 
whole case rests on me as this means he will fall flat on face-stop-exactly what he has 
said on record unknown here so cannot reply in detail but will be home in few days and 
will contact you then-stop.’87
Senator McCarthy, questioned in the Congressional record in March, 1950, was asked 
about eighty-one cases of charges he had made. Senator Millard Tydings, chair of the committee, 
stated to McCarthy that “I am sure, Senator, that you yourself realize that the individuals who are 
charged with disloyalty to our Government are confronted with one o f the most serious charges 
that can be leveled at a patriotic or other individual.”88To this, McCarthy responded “especially 
the ‘or other.’89 McCarthy was displaying his way o f playing with others, politicians and 
newsmen alike.
With Tydings and his four month investigation, McCarthy also, in the words o f William 
F. Buckley Jr. and L. Brent Bozell was allotted “something less, surely, than the span o f time 
normally allotted to a man for defining him self.. .yet it was in the course o f the Tydings
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investigation that he earned his stripes as a ‘wholesale character assassin.'90 This was also where 
“McCarthyism, the derisive epithet coined by Owen Lattimore, became, with a boost from the 
Tydings Committee, a household word. ..and his charge that the State Department had been 
guilty o f lax security practices was consigned to history as ‘a fraud and a hoax.’91 Tydings, a 
normally conservative Democrat, had been placed in charge of what was about to become a three 
ring circus, with he and his fellow Senators as ring-masters.
On March 21, 1950, McCarthy had told Tydings “if you crack this case, it will be the 
biggest espionage case in the history of this country.”92 This was a bold claim, coming on the 
heels o f the Hiss/Chambers trials, the selling of nuclear secrets by Klaus Fuchs and the ongoing 
Rosenberg trial. McCarthy told the press that “I am willing to stand or fall on this one. If I am to 
be wrong on this, I think the subcommittee would be justified in not taking my other cases too 
seriously.”93 More evidence and accusations were demanded and presented at the end of March, 
1950.
President Truman had requested the FBI file on Owen Lattimore from FBI chief Hoover, 
who refused to hand over the complete document, but, just in case, began to have the file 
photocopied.94 The supervisor o f the operation, Alan Hamden Belmont, prepared an analysis of 
the file. In this document was made mention of “ 167 wiretaps and intercepted mail involving 
wholly innocent persons.. .the warning to Blue Network not to hire Lattimore, the charge that 
Atlantic-Little Brown was a ‘communist tinged' publishing house and letters to and from the
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CIA.”95 The charges against Lattimore looked more than bad. They made not only the State 
Department but the machinery o f the Truman administration look inept, when on March 26, 
columnist Drew Pearson took to radio and preempted McCarthy’s game by announcing 
Lattimore as the man McCarthy had accused of being the top Soviet spy in the United States.96 
McCarthy began looking for the most dramatic evidence he could assemble against Lattimore.
McCarthy found his evidence in the form of Freda Utley, an admitted Communist, and 
Alfred Kohlberg, an industrialist and noted anti-Communist. On March 23 or 24 of 1950-the date 
is imprecise-McCarthy had dinner with Kohlberg and, according to Kohlberg, took his version of 
the story o f the Toss o f China’ to Communism as gospel, repeating it a week later on the Senate 
floor, modified only slightly by his interaction with Utley, and managed by a team of writers 
who organized his speeches, including “Jean Kerr-later his wife-Charles Kerset, former 
congressman from Wisconsin; Ed Nellor, a reporter formerly with Hearst; Joe’s chief 
investigator and right-hand man, Don Surine.”97 McCarthy was not a one man show.
According to Robert Newman, when it came to credibility, Surine was the biggest 
liability on McCarthy’s staff. “Surine was everything a good investigator should not be: 
impulsive, inept, cocky, careless. He had been with the FBI for ten years; it was a miracle he had 
lasted so long. Hoover fired him in 1950 for involvement with a prostitute” and that this came 
about “during FBI investigation o f a white slavery ring. Surine always lied about this, claiming 
he had resigned from the bureau.”98 It is important to consider the people with whom McCarthy 
surrounded himself, for it tells much of the man and his judgments. Surine was consistent in one 
regard. He:
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compounded McCarthy’s recklessness and mendacity...almost singlehandedly got 
McCarthy embroiled in the fraudulent activities of Charles Davis, a psychotic who 
fabricated documents intended to discredit John Carter Vincent and who falsely charged 
Edward R. Murrow with having been on the Soviet payroll in 1934. Davis was denied 
security clearance by the Department of Defense, yet he was McCarthy’s 'contact man' 
in collecting classified documents from McCarthy’s loyal underground in the military, 
the CIA, Justice and State."
It can be surmised that it was owing to Surine that McCarthy so often had to back off his
claims. As early as March 29, 1950 McCarthy back-peddled, shifting away from calling
Lattimore the top Soviet espionage agent in America. McCarthy said that:
I fear in the case o f Lattimore, I may have perhaps placed too much stress on the question 
o f whether or not he has been an espionage agent. In view of his position of tremendous 
power in the State Department as the architect o f our far eastern policy, the more 
important aspect o f his case deals with his aims and whether they coincide with the aims 
o f Soviet Russia. Therefore, forgetting for the time being any question of membership in 
the Communist Party or participation in espionage, I would like to deal briefly with what 
this man advocates and what he believes in.100
Lattimore, as so many others were and had been, was being tried for what he-potentially- 
believed, for what might have been his intentions. What McCarthy wished to do was to “brand 
Lattimore as a loyal Soviet servant.. . influencing American policy, which led to the loss of 
China.” This required McCarthy to overstate Lattimore’s importance at the State Department, 
which he did when he said “I believe you can ask almost any school child who the architect of 
our far eastern policy is, and he will say Owen Lattimore.”10M cCarthy was overreaching but 
that was established as part of his nature.
Senator McCarthy had accused Latimore, then at work in Afghanistan alongside, but not 
for, the State Department, o f being the top Soviet espionage agent in America, a charge which 
Lattimore refuted. It was not 1950 but 1949 that real trouble began for Lattimore.
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Lattimore’s FBI file had been deactivated during the war, but by 1949, previously 
discredited witnesses were getting a second hearing from the agency, and the file was 
reopened. As turmoil in China increased, Lattimore began speaking publicly about his 
disenchantment with Chiang Kai-Shek, urging American policymakers to adjust to the 
possibility of an eventual victory by Mao Zedong’s Communist insurgency, and arguing 
that Mao was not necessarily a pawn o f Russian Communists. His strong opinions, 
forcibly expressed, made him powerful enemies, especially those on the right looking for 
scapegoats for the ‘loss’ of China to the Communists.102
What is presented here only scratches the surface. The FBI file had been reopened 
because in December 1948, a man named Alexander Barmine fingered Lattimore as part of a 
Russian spy ring. The files are currently “so heavily redacted it’s hard to assess the statements or 
glean the details, but they give some idea of what the original charges were based on.”103 Hoover 
him self sent a memo to the CIA on June 22, 1949 in which he wrote “various informants have 
identified Lattimore as a possible espionage agent-”and after more details are deleted-“while 
acting as advisor to Chiang Kai-shek, was divulging information to the Russians.” 104These 
accusations, along with McCarthy’s, upset Lattimore.
In response, Lattimore noted in Ordeal that he did not understand why these charges 
were being brought. Lattimore swore that “I do not have a mind like a communist.” 105 An 
interesting comment because of how deeply it speaks to the socio-political atmosphere of post- 
World War Two America and particularly after Mao took over in China. As one last detail, 
Chiang Kai-shek’s director of military intelligence, Tai-Li, warned him that in 1941 Lattimore 
had sent coded messages to Yenan from Chungking. 106Lattimore knew why McCarthy attacked 
him from this position.
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I was not a State Department advisor, but he (McCarthy) was not calling me a State 
Department advisor just out of ignorance. He was using me as an excuse to attack the 
China policy of the State Department. Evidently, he was hoping to throw the 
administration off balance in an election year.. .he was relying on the China Lobby to 
help him put up a smoke screen.107
If the evidence against Lattimore was true, there was not much smoke needed, and 
Lattimore’s connection to the State Department was one that the China Lobby, a powerful sector 
within national politics during the late 1940s and early 1950s, was eager to exploit. In a 
document dated April 17, 1950, Under-Secretary of State John Peurifoy wrote Tydings that 
Lattimore had been paid out the Department’s International Funds, as an advisor in Japan in 
1945 and 1946108, and further that:
Mr. Lattimore was one of 28 persons to lecture on a program known as ‘Meet the 
Public’, which was given at the Department’s Foreign Service Institute. He gave one 
lecture on June 5, 1946. This program was initiated by the Department’s Office of Public 
Affairs and was designed to bring before departmental personnel the viewpoints of 
various persons who were working on, or interested in, foreign affairs. In this capacity, 
Mr. Lattimore was not an employee of the Department and received no remuneration.109
Lattimore noted “a pattern” by McCarthy, regarding himself and Phillip Jessup, a fellow 
diplomat and the attacks against it, charges originally laid out by Alfred C. Kohlberg, described 
as a "millionaire fanatic who for years had spent a lot of money trying to work up pressure for all 
out aid to Chiang Kai Shek.” 110 The name Kohlberg is important here.
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A major player within the China Lobby, Kohlberg was against the Institute of Pacific 
Relations, and saw them as pro-China, and anti-Shek. Kohlberge held Lattimore responsible for 
what had happened in China. Kohlberg had once been an importer of linens and laces in China 
under what would today be considered sweatshop conditions. In 1943, Kohlberg had learned 
from a Dr. Maurice Williams that, when it came to news about Communist support in China “the 
central source of most of the untruths about China was the Institute of Pacific Relations."111 
Kohlberg had earlier been very concerned about what he regarded as what had been “a flow of 
mendacious reporting from China blinding the Roosevelt administration and the U.S. public 
about the true (or positive) nature of China’s government and army.” 112 Once the Second World 
War had concluded, Kohlberg established a newspaper, Plain Talk, to counteract what he 
deemed as pro-Communist propaganda regarding China.113
Along with men like Henry Luce, Kohlberg “demanded unconditional support for Chiang 
Kai-Shek.” 114Kohlbergh wrote for a Chinese-Catholic paper, China Monthly, and was a 
contributor to Senator Styles Bridges of New Hampshire, a “champion in congress of unlimited 
intervention in China, a part of the China Lobby, involving William J. Goodwin, and Joseph p. 
Kamp, o f the America Betrayed pamphlet.”115 In 1944 Kamp “refused to list his contributors 
and was indicted by a federal grand jury on obstruction and defeat of the war effort charges, via 
the constitutional educational league, which worked in 42 and 43 on seditious grounds against 
the army and its effort.” 116 Moving on from Kamp, Kohlberg had in 1949 “turned down an 
invitation to attend a Waldorf-Astoria fund raiser because of his frustration with the Dewey-
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dominated party’s refusal to open up the ‘who lost China’ issue.” 117 This was important to 
Kohlberg, and he made no secret of how he was “ashamed that the Republicans failed to protest 
the sellout of Eastern Europe and Asia.” 118 His alliance with McCarthy came about because 
McCarthy was the first major government official to take him seriously.
Moreover “McCarthy’s willingness to take on the administration directly came as a 
welcome breath of fresh air.” 119 The role of the “China Lobby” must never be discounted when 
considering McCarthy’s entry into being an anti-Communist, or from why Lattimore and his 
compatriots became targets. The “loss of China” was the singular global shift o f the era, the one 
repeatedly pointed to as proof of encroaching Communism and chicanery within the United 
States government.
Amidst all this, the claims about the “China Lobby” by Lattimore, must be given some 
distance, since they were written in his book Ordeal By Slander, a public defense of the charges 
by McCarthy. Yet, they provide an important entry point for understanding how print media, 
along with radio and television, and even film, would play a significant part in the misnomer 
phenomenon called McCarthyism, and the role of China’s ‘loss’ in that era.
Lattimore wrote:
The China Lobby wanted a simplified picture of China with all-out supporters of Chiang 
Kai-Shek lined up on one side, communists on the other side and nobody allowed in the 
middle. Independents like myself must be cleared out of the middle of the picture because 
we knew what we were talking about and because people read our books and articles. The 
simplest way to clear us out would be by the kind of double-flank attack indicated by the 
McCarthy charges-calling us Communists and at the same time accusing us of close 
connections with the State Department. I was beginning to realize now that what made 
these tactics possible was the deepening atmosphere of uncertainty, suspicion and divided
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opinion in America. The charges themselves were flimsy, but they were taking advantage 
of-and at the same time contributing to-an increasingly nervous and panicky public 
opinion. Even the ‘top Russian espionage agent’ charge was not something to be laughed 
off just because o f its outrageous falsity. For a long time now fear o f spies had been 
feeding fear o f Communist subversion, and fears of Communism had been building up 
fear o f espionage. With nervous fear abroad in the land, it might be easy to smear a man 
like me who had worked for years in China and in other countries in which communism 
had become increasingly important.120
There was an air of suspicion, a nervousness and a general desire to conform to 
standards, out of fear, hatred or ignorance, which normalized certain patterns of behavior in an 
increasingly nationalistic fashion. What was lost on both sides was that such rampant nationalism 
mirrored the Communism that was at the center of the attacks in the first place. The failure to 
report this, and how such questions were avoided, is another facet in how the media mishandled 
the McCarthy issue.
Lattimore called the accusations by McCarthy “a Goebbels sized lie, so big it must be 
true, people would th ink.. .McCarthy was not the master of just the big lie, but of the middle 
sized lie and the little ball bearing lie that rolls around and around and helps the wheels of the lie 
machinery to turn over.” 121The so-called Era of McCarthy illustrates points o f view, competing 
references and spheres of influence. It is politics and social discourse writ large. For all the 
bluster, one vital component was silence. To this, Lattimore wrote that
If I could be intimidated, or if people could be frightened out of having anything to do 
with me, it would be a long step toward successful intimidation of all university research 
and teaching, of the free expression of opinion in the press and on the radio, and of the 
State Department in its dealings with all independent specialists and consultants.122
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The question becomes, how serious was the threat by both McCarthy and Communism, 
against freedom of speech, freedom of expression? T/'Lattimore was innocent, it is a fair 
question. Latimore states that his experience in Asia taught him that:
Communism frightens us because our history as a nation has been lived under 
democracy. We know the benefits o f democracy, and we do not want to gamble against 
any strange doctrine from abroad.. .to hundreds of millions of people in Asia, 
communism is not as terrifying as it is to Americans. They have never had any 
democracy and have no democracy to lose.123
The America o f which Lattimore spoke was one which he wrote of as suggesting that 
dissent, for McCarthy, minoritizes you, and that “any man who thinks independently is in a 
minority; since the communists are also a minority, accuse the independent thinker of being a 
commie, then deny he is thinking independently and accuse him o f being regimented along with 
other commies.” 124 Lattimore’s words were carefully chosen. They painted a picture o f a man 
who uses the terminology of the anti-communist. If true, then McCarthy was wrong, but if 
correct, Lattimore was merely being intelligent. This doubt is the great danger of the sort of 
suspicions that McCarthy is credited with popularizing.
In truth, McCarthy, popularized little, but instead became a vocal front man for existing 
trends already present within American culture. Other Republicans, including Republican 
Senator Robert Taft o f Ohio and Republican Senator Kenneth S. Wherry of Nebraska, urged 
disloyalty investigations, with Wherry calling for Secretary o f State Dean Acheson’s job because 
“he was a bad security risk” and it was Taft who decried “the pro-Communist group in the State 
Department who surrendered to every demand of Russia at Yalta and Potsdam, and promoted at
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every opportunity the Communist cause in China.”125In Ordeal, Lattimore outlines one of these 
trends when he mentions a friend in the State Department who became frightened after passing 
along an article from a public magazine.
This friend got to thinking, as a government employee, that she had exposed herself to 
real danger by helping us at all. She had done nothing that infringed any kind of 
regulation. But the terrible thing is that she was quite right-she was in real danger. The 
state o f panic government agencies is such that she could have been attacked by anyone 
snooping for McCarthy. If she had been attacked, her intimidated superiors might very 
well have reprimanded her, instead of defending her.126
Evidence exists to contend that the danger was real, and so one question has been 
answered, which is that there are clear conflicts with the Constitution, in regards to the conduct 
o f the various committees set up to investigate Communist activity. Lattimore wrote that 
America should be careful in how they conducted these investigations, because:
We cannot for our own safety, entrust the expert study of Marxism only to reactionaries 
who are opposed to all forms of liberalism as well as to Marxism. Still less can we afford 
to place ourselves in the hands of people whose claim to be experts rests solely on the 
fact that they are ex-communists.127
Lattimore claimed to be concerned about tightening of the control o f information under 
McCarthy and his compatriots. It is fair to consider how balanced such information would be, 
coming from people who in a court of law, would be treated as hostile witnesses. As Lattimore 
noted:
Beyond the shores of our own country, all the many constructive possibilities of our 
foreign policy are being frozen by the cold war. The freeze is already so deep that 
nothing is left o f foreign policy but the cold war itself. And yet it should be obvious that 
the cold war offers no solution either for our own problems or for the problems of the 
world.128
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Lattimore’s experience in Asia gave a clue about what might happen if this came to pass 
and, drawing from his time in Afghanistan, wrote that Afghanis were:
Frightened o f the idea o f being put in the front line of the cold war against Russia when, 
with the news coming from America, they felt more and more that American backing 
might be feeble, hesitant and crippled by an irresponsible and fantastic civil war among 
American congressman and senators.129
It was against this mindset that Lattimore portrayed himself as fighting when he was 
finally called before the Tydings committee in spring of 1950. He had at one time been unsure of 
his next move, yet his support at home, from family and closest friends, gave him the strength to 
carry on. His wife, Eleanor, wrote two letters, dated March 24 and 25 o f 1950, that:
You are going to have the opportunity o f a lifetime to affect the future of democracy in 
this country, McCarthy has staked everything now on this one case, so that if he is 
thoroughly demolished now his whole house of cards tumbles and his methods and all
that he stands for fall with him  you will have saved the 81 people on his State
Department list and a lot of other people who will soon be on other lists if  he gets by with 
this, (possibly some of the 81 shouldn’t be saved, but you will have saved the good and 
the innocent.)130
On April 12, 1950, at the height of the hearings, a memorandum was circulated. In it, 
Senator Tydings, always a loyal Democrat, was not going to see his party injured by sleeping 
with the enemy and “argued that McCarthy and those for whom he ran interference had created 
an atmosphere o f suspicion.. .stymied the administration’s domestic program and threatened to 
undercut its highly successful foreign policies.” 131 Tydings was not finished, and “suggested the 
full FBI file on Lattimore, after deletion of names o f informants and certification by J. Edgar 
Hoover, should be shown to the Committee. Next, the files of McCarthy's eighty-one suspects
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should be made available.” 132 Tydings, as head of a committee intended to investigate, 
supposedly from a neutral standpoint, the charges McCarthy had brought forth, demonstrated the 
exact sort of factionalism and party bias McCarthy was accused of bringing. The public response 
to the allegations was only beginning.
According to the front page of the April 21, 1950 edition of the Kentucky New Era, 
Senator McCarthy cited Louis Budenz’s sworn testimony concerning Owen Latimore. Budenz 
had testified that “men. ..high in the party, Earl Browder, Frederick Vanderbilt Field, and Jack 
Stachel” 133 were aware of this and McCarthy remarked that “I think the investigating committee 
ought to subpoena those men and get their story.”134 Yet, while McCarthy was charging that 
Lattimore was Russia’s top spy in the United States, Budenz claimed, on the witness stand, that 
“that accusation was not technically accurate.. .but he did back up the senator’s contention that 
communists exercised disciplinary action over Lattimore.” What McCarthy did, according to 
Medford Stanton Evans, was to begin:
a series of interlocking, and incendiary, charges: (1) That the Communist global 
apparatus had made a sustained attempt to penetrate the U.S. government and subvert its 
foreign policy decisions, most specifically toward China; (2) that official defenses against 
such penetration, especially in the State Department, ranged from weak to nonexistent;
(3) that the facts about all this had been concealed from the American people-ignored, 
downplayed, or covered up by the authorities whose job it was to guard against such 
dangers.135
The following examinations, conducted between March 1950 and May 1950, yielded 
many moments of candor, as well as confusion, anger and denial over those questions. Issues of 
loyalty, foreign policy and definitions of patriotism abound within the rambling testimony
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presented in the documents, which stretched until June 1950. Several of the witnesses presented 
seemed to do so out of either personal grudges against Lattimore, or, and perhaps in addition to. 
self-interest.
To this end, Soviet espionage agent Louis F. Budenz's appearance before the
committee holds much interest. Questioned by Senator Tydings and Senator Theodore Green,
Budenz introduced a level of doubt into the proceedings, suggesting that the words used by his
former superiors in the Communist Party were, despite claims within the body of the testimony,
imprecise and open to interpretation. Tydings asked Budenz about Lattimore and his connection
to Jack Stachel, whom Budenz had said described Lattimore as “helpful” and to which Tydings,
directing the answer, said “he advised you to consider Lattimore as a Communist?” 136 To which
Budenz then replied “yes, sir. I said that Stachel said to consider Lattimore as a Communist in
1944, when he was with Mr. Wallace.” 137
The Congressional Record shows that Budenz testified about Lattimore being
designated “XL” in Communist paperwork. Yet, Budenz denied that there was proof of this. To
that end, the following exchange occurred immediately:
Senator Tydings: Were they, as near as you can recollect, his precise words ?
Mr. Budenz. Yes, sir.
Senator Tydings. That Lattimore was "helpful" and that he said for you to "treat 
Lattimore as a Communist.
Mr. Budenz: Consider him.
Senator Tydings; "Consider Lattimore as a Communist?"
Mr. Budenz; Yes, sir-Wait just a minute about that "helpful."I don't remember that 
phrase specifically, Senator. I remember Jack Stachel said that Lattimore was helpful in 
the time of the Amerasia case.138
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Budenz got this information second-hand, a recurring theme. There was nothing in this 
portion o f the testimony directly linking Lattimore. The absence o f evidence is not proof of 
innocence, nor does it indicate guilt well hidden, but it is important to note how Budenz never 
had firsthand confirmation from Lattimore, or by observation of Lattimore, that he was a 
Communist Party member, Budenz continued his testimony. Tydings seemed to become 
confused, while Budenz remained calm throughout this portion of the proceedings. Budenz 
stated that Jack Stachel told him in 1944, to “consider Lattimore as a Communist” 139 and 
confirmed that this was not a mere suggestion by Stachel when Tydings asked him if this was 
normal procedure. Budenz informed him that it would have been impossible for Stachel to make 
such a statement based on anything less than confirmation.140
Mr. Budenz: This was a regular formula used by Stachel to deal with people who were 
in the Communist movement.
Senator Tydings: And he said for you to consider him as a Communist?
Mr. Budenz: Yes, sir. He used that, by the way, that phraseology on a number of 
occasions in regard to other people. That is, I was compelled to know, more or less, as 
a matter o f fact not more or less, but definitely these people.
Senator Tydings: Now, you also said that Lattimore was designated as "XL," I think, or 
something pretty close to that.
Mr. Budenz: That is right.
Senator Tydings: As a Communist designation?
Mr. Budenz: That is right. .
Senator Tydings: Did his signature appear opposite that designation?
Mr. Budenz: Oh no. This is onionskin instructions coming from 
the Politburo.
Senator Tydings: So, there was nothing to identity Lattimore with 
the "XL" on the onionskin itself?
Mr. Budenz: Only the instructions given us by the Politburo.141
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Tydings appeared to be leading Budenz, except that Budenz consistently baffled
Tydings by offering information, such as the uncertainty regarding the ‘onionskin*. There was
also the introduction of clergyman “Father” James F. Kearney’s accusations about Lattimore:
Senator Tydings: In what respect do you claim that Reverend Kearney’s article 
corroborates your accusations of Mr. Lattimore?
Mr. Budenz: Well, in the sense, as Father Kearney says that Mr. Lattimore is the person 
most responsible for the disaster in Asia, and he goes on to indicate Mr. Lattimore's 
views.
Senator Tydings: So that would be what Father Kearney would say— that would 
accentuate rather than otherwise—  it would be in line with what you say. Now, would 
Father Kearney have any intimate knowledge to your knowledge, that Mr. Lattimore 
was a Communist, that you did not?
Mr. Budenz: Oh, no, he would not have, not that I know, unless he had something. He 
was a missionary in the Orient, I believe. In fact, he is on his way back now. The only 
thing is that his analysis of Mr Lattimore's views I thought strengthened my own 
declarations. That is, I did not put it forward as absolutely a mandatory thing, but 
confirmatory.142
Budenz was examined regarding the end of his direct involvement in the Communist 
Party, which was limited after his “resignation” from the Party in October 1945, a fact disputed 
by Senator Green:
Senator Green: Excuse me. I asked that question. He did not resign. A Communist was 
not allowed to resign. He was expelled.
Mr. Budenz: I am just using it as a general rough term—  left the party.
Senator Tydings: Separated from the party.
Mr. Budenz: I didn't resign. I arranged carefully whereby I wouldn't resign. In fact, my 
name is on the letterhead on the date I was received in the Catholic Church of St.
Patrick's. I did that so that I would not be framed. I might explain this to you. Senator. 
Senator Tydings: That is not important.
Senator Green: I think it is very important.143
It would be very important if Budenz was unable to verify Lattimore. The questioning continued:
Senator Tydings: You may ask it on your time. In the approximate five years since 
1945, did you report Owen Lattimore to the FBI as a Communist, or a Communist 
agent?
Mr Budenz: I don't recall that I did. I may have. Senator, but I don't recall: but. I might 
say that, Senator, just my regard to my own actions there that I have not reported quite a
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few people because I cannot possibly do it.
Senator Green: You have not what?
Mr. Budenz: Reported quite a few. That is the reason I decided to make up this list of 
hundreds of names so that once and for all I can give the FBI all the names that I had.144
Following this, Budenz denied having mentioned any definite discussion details, with a 
State Department Agent, in 1947. Tydings demanded Budenz tell of Lattimore’s association with 
the Communist Party, to which Budenz replied that he was uncertain, given the behavior of 
communists, before pointing a finger at Dr. J.B. Mathews, who headed the House Un-American 
investigation143:
Mr. Budenz: Dr. J. B. Mathews, a well-known investigator, was in 
charge of the Dies investigation
Senator McMahon: And who was a member of the party at one 
time?
Mr. Budenz: He says he was not. He was very close to them and was placed with the 
responsibility of their most important Communist front, the League Against War and 
Fascism, and broke with them.
Senator Tydings: Didn't you talk also to a special agent o f the State Department in 
1947?
Mr. Budenz: Well, I cannot recollect that, but I would say that I have had several 
telephone calls from the State Department representatives, and I have always been very 
evasive because on the telephone I do not give information. I was trying to show you. 
Senator, that even in this case, the Senator McCarthy case, I was called by Dr. J. B. 
Mathews, and he said to me that he had information that I knew that Lattimore was a 
Communist. I simply said "Whatever I have to say about Lattimore, I will only say 
before the committee, under subpoena."
Senator Tydings: Would you therefore deny that you said in 1947, to any 
Representative o f the State Department, that you could not be called at that time, you 
could not recall any incident which definitely would indicate that Lattimore was a 
member of the Communist Party?
Mr. Budenz: I won't deny it.146
Budenz seemed afraid of the committee, or at least evasive, and there was obviously 
much confusion on the part of both interrogator and interrogated. Budenz, questioned by 
Tydings, said he did not earlier confirm or deny anything because of that earlier discussion being
144 State Department, 581
l4? State Department, 581
146State Department, 582
47
on the telephone, which he mistrusted. Tydings eventually brought the investigation to a
different figure, that of Stachel. 147The following exchange casts doubt on Lattimore's guilt or, at
the very least on the validity o f the testimony by Budenz:
Senator Tydings: But, in this case you had nothing to check up on other than your 
conversation with Mr. Stachel, because he was the man that had previously...
Mr. Budenz: Oh, yes; I may have had
Senator Tydings: Excuse me, because I am directing myself particularly to the testimony 
that Mr. Stachel and some other people, I think it was Stachel who said "You are to 
consider Lattimore as a member of the party?"
Mr. Budenz: That is correct. . . .
Senator Tydings: And you were outlined about more activities there, and you were told 
that Lattimore was very helpful.
Mr. Budenz: That is correct.
Senator Tydings: You were also told that the movement was proceeding ery favorably 
and you knew Lattimore was head of the magazine. Well, now, if you had all that 
information in your mind, why would you say, in September 1947, that you did not 
recall at that time any incident which definitely indicated that Lattimore was a member 
o f the partv?148
Budenz again played coy, repeating his mistrust o f telephones and dancing around
Tyding’s suggestion that Stachel had told Budenz that Lattimore was a Communist.
Senator Tydings: I do not blame you for saying over the telephone, "I don't care to 
discuss it," or I don't blame you for saying on the telephone that, "This is 
something I might want to talk to you privately about"; but, instead of picking one of 
the things that would have protected the position you rightly wanted to protect, did 
you not say at that time, "I am unable to recall at this time any incident which 
definitely would indicate that Lattimore was a member of the party?" And to convey 
the impression to your own G overnm ent,after you left the Communist Party, that you 
had nothing in mind that would show Lattimore was a member of the Communist 
Party ?
Mr. Budenz: I did not have the time or energy to check carefully on the facts I had 
before me. I always do that, and I have made that reply, incidentally, more than once, 
along similar lines.149
So, Budenz had “neither the time nor the energy” to be careful regarding facts which
led to accusations? How reliable could such a man be? Republican Senator Henry Cabot Lodge,
147State Department 583
148State Department 582
149 State Department 583
48
Jr, of Massachusetts, became enraged, calling the interrogation of Budenz ''a  complete waste of 
time.” 150 Tydings and Green then turned attention to Mr. Frederick Vanderbilt Field, who 
worked with Lattimore at the Institute of Pacific Relations, who despite his affirmations of 
Lattimore, also admitted he was not in a position to know, without any doubt, if Lattimore was or 
was not a communist. Field stated he had no certain knowledge of Lattimore as a Communist. 
Field was in a position to know, since he was then serving a prison sentence for contempt over a 
case concerning his involvement in the founding of Amerasia.151 Amerasia was a magazine 
published from 1937-1947, which focused on Far-Eastern affairs.
The magazine had caused concern within the United States government. Indeed, in the 
words of Medford Stanton Evans, the controversy surrounding Amerasia is the key to 
understanding McCarthy:
The core of McCarthy’s case was that security problems at the State Department and the 
course o f U.S. policy in Asia were indissolubly connected. His chief exhibit-much cited 
in his early speeches and before the Tydings panel-was the improbable tale of the small 
pro-Communist journal, Amerasia. McCarthy capsuled the case on February 20, 
presented a fat dossier on it to Tydings, then discussed it at even greater length on the 
Senate floor on March 30. For McCarthy, this was the touchstone of pro-Communist 
subversion in our country and of official complicity with it.132
This was not the first time the magazine had entered public debate:
Amerasia had previously burst into public view-to disappear as quickly-in June 1945. 
Agents of the FBI, after many weeks’ surveillance, had arrested two editors of the journal 
and one o f its frequent writers, along with three U.S. government officials (Andrew Roth, 
Emmanuel Larsen, John Stewart Service) accused of feeding them secret data. Coincident 
with the arrests, the bureau reaped a harvest of roughly 1,000 government documents in 
the possession of the defendants. These dealt much with Asian matters, and many bore 
the label 'secret,’ 'top secret,’ or ‘confidential.’
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McCarthy said “o f the nature of Amerasia. there could be little doubt" and pointed to its 
backers, including “its chief financial angel, Frederick V. Field, a notorious propagandist for the 
Soviet Union, named by Elizabeth Bentley as the Communist Party's domestic commissar for 
Asian matters.” 153 This was the same Field whom McCarthy had earlier recommended for 
subpoena.
Amerasia. without any question, was replete with Communists and Communist 
sympathizers, and the list of their names, activities and legal entanglements is illuminating:
The principal editor was Philip Jaffe, a long-time Soviet apologist, friend of Communist 
Party boss Earl Browder, and zealous fan of Bolsheviks in China. Its staffers and writers 
included a veritable galaxy of identified Communists, pro-Communists, and fellow 
travellers. (Indeed, among its former employees, still hobnobbing with Jaffe, was one 
Joseph Bernstein, known to the FBI as an active Soviet agent.)
The biggest fish caught in the Amerasia net was State Department official Service, one of 
Vincent's “China hands” who like his Treasury Department roommate had sent a steady 
stream of dispatches back from China attacking Chiang and urging that we dump him 
(sample: “We need not support Chiang in the belief that he represents pro-American or 
democratic groups. . . we need feel no ties of gratitude to Chiang.”) On returning to the 
United States in April 1945, Service immediately took to hanging out with Jaffe (whom 
he supposedly had just met), delivering copies of his reports, and commenting that “What 
I said about the military plans is, o f course, very secret” (recorded by FBI surveillance).
Given all this, McCarthy said, J. Edgar Hoover believed he had an “airtight case,” and 
Justice Department officials geared up for prosecution. Then, for some mysterious 
reason, Justice decided to downplay the matter and treat it as a minor indiscretion;
Service got off scott-free and was restored to State Department duties. Jaffe and Larsen 
escaped with fines, and all the others walked. In essence, the whole thing was shoved 
under the official rug, to be conveniently forgotten. It was, McCarthy charged, a security 
breach and cover-up o f immense proportions.. .We now know, however, that all of this 
was false, and that McCarthy was right in what he said. The whole thing was fixed from 
the beginning, engineered by Elizabeth Bentley’s agent Lauchlin Currie, operating from 
the White House, and carried out by Washington wheeler-dealer Thomas Corcoran. The 
truth of this emerged a decade ago when FBI wiretaps from the '40s came to the surface;
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these showed Currie, Corcoran, Service and Justice officials conspiring to deep-six the 
case, and succeeding.154
The Amerasia case was in mind as the congressional testimonies continued throughout 
1950. Hoover was alarmed at McCarthy’s claims and “caused a search to be made to see if he 
had gone overboard in 1945; he had never said anything like it” in regards to the case being air­
tight. l35The involvement of John Service is noted by author Richard H. Rovere in his work 
Senator Joe McCarthy. Concerning Service, Rovere wrote:
He was a bona fide State Department man who had had a good deal of difficulty in 
security proceedings, and who had, in 1945, admitted to turning over government 
documents to Amerasia...Service was not a communist. On the contrary, he was a highly 
regarded career diplomat, and his involvement in the Amerasia case was not as damaging 
as it first appeared-since the documents were not secret.156
Such details did not matter to either side o f the Committee in the atmosphere of the 
time. During Lattimore’s first round of hearings with McCarthy, the Senator from Wisconsin 
made a number o f claims about the professor from Johns Hopkins. Among these were falsehoods 
about Roosevelt appointing Lattimore as adviser to Chiang-Kai-Shek, since he could only have 
nominated him, on advice of Henry Wallace, who did not, with Lattimore’s support, betray Shek, 
nor did Lattimore lead the Pauley mission and not ever did the State Department send Lattimore 
to Afghanistan, since it was The United Nations-Lattimore’s ultimate employer-who had that 
authority.137 Congressional testimony had already shown the initial case against Lattimore to be 
one based on evidence, which, as presented, was lacking in credibility.
On April 6, 1950, Lattimore’s appearance before the Tydings committee was televised, 
in an event that brought both McCarthy and Lattimore to the American public at large. McCarthy
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was not allowed to cross-examine Lattimore, and the Democrats arranged for it to be the reading 
o f a statement by Lattimore. Tydings, while engaged in the hearings, seemed to go back and 
forth on the question o f Lattimore’s guilt, but was for the moment in the Lattimore camp 
following Lattimore’s statement to the committee.158 Lattimore’s statement on freedom of speech 
was “lengthy and hard-hitting.. .denouncing McCarthy to his face.. .lecturing McCarthy that ‘he 
who contributes to the destruction of this process is either a fool or an enemy of his country.’139 
Lattimore had won this public battle, but it was far from over for either side. “Lattimore 
lamented his tawdry persecution, but on television it was McCarthy who endured the 
ordeal.” 160McCarthy would be forced to regroup as the hearings continued both with and without 
him self and Lattimore.
At those Congressional hearings, one day in late April o f 1950, Senator Henry Cabot 
Lodge, Jr began to question if  Budenz was capable of grasping the gravity of his testimony 
before giving the microphone to Senator Green:
Senator Green: In other words, what you have given already is the extent o f the help 
that you feel able to give the committee in its work.
Mr. Field: I don't believe I can do anything more, Mr. Senator....
Senator Tydings: Now, do you or do yon not know, of your own knowledge, of any 
disloyal acts to our Government that Owen Lattimore has ever performed?
Mr. Field: Mr. Chairman, to the best of my knowledge, Mr. Lattimore has in no sense 
or on any occasion been disloyal.161
Tydings and Field’s next interaction reaffirmed the later’s stance that Lattimore’s 
loyalty was to the United states, despite pressure from Senator Green. Tydings questioned Field 
about the work he did with Lattimore at the Institute for Pacific Relations and also the magazine
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Amerasia. which Field maintained was logical given Lattimore’s worldwide acknowledgement 
as an expert in Asian affairs. Tydings specifically asked Field if Lattimore inserted propaganda 
into the magazine, in the following exchange:
Senator Tydings: Do you or are you in a position to say whether or not at any time 
during your association with Mr. Lattimore, and the Pacific relations unit, that Mr. 
Lattimore, directly or indirectly engaged in any conversation, any undertaking, any 
intrigue, or any other act which had for its purpose the placing of either persons on the 
payroll o f the magazine and institute on the one hand, or the insertion o f articles that 
were calculated to be there other than for the purpose of the magazine proper, upon the 
other hand ?
Mr. Field: No, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Tydings: I have no more questions.
Senator Hickenlooper: Are you in a position, Mr. Field, to know whether or not Mr. 
Lattimore is or is not a Communist ?
Mr. Field: No. I put the answer very differently. Senator. I said that —  I put it in two 
ways : One, that to the very best of my knowledge, he was not; and, on some other 
occasion, I believe I said that I had no grounds whatsoever for believing he was a 
Communist. 162
This is an important distinction. He did not answer that Lattimore was or was not a 
communist, but rather that he himself had no grounds for believing that Lattimore was. Field 
maintained that he and Lattimore were not of a mind on certain issues, in an exchange with 
Republican Senator Bourke Hickenlooper of Iowa:
Senator Hickenlooper: Mr. Field, you had associations with Mr. Lattimore over a 
considerable period of time in connection especially with the Institute o f Pacific 
Relations. Would you say that Mr. Lattimore's social and political views with respect 
to policies in the Orient and social and political views in the United States quite 
generally coincide with yours as a result o f your experience with him?
Mr. Field. That is an extremely difficult question to answer, Mr. Senator.163
Field instead testified that he and Lattimore were not of the same view on political
matters in the Orient over the preceding decade, and refused to incriminate himself when
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Republican Senator Bourke B. Hickenlooper o f Iowa asked him about specifics of social and 
political differences. Field, given his background in Communist activity, was either lying in 
order to protect a fellow Communist or, at least, fellow traveler, or saying that Lattimore did not 
qualify as a Communist. This would line up with the idea of Lattimore as an opportunist o f the 
highest order.
As the investigation continued, Tydings, eager to be done with the proceedings and 
seemingly convinced already of Lattimore’s complete innocence, encouraged Field to discuss 
whether or not these names were linked to communist activity. John C. Vincent, whom Field was 
certain had never been a communist, was listed, along with Hal dor Hanson and John S. Service, 
by Senator Tydings as people of interest to the investigating committee and of possible relation 
to Owen Lattimore. Field, with an acknowledged background in Communist activity, swore 
these three men were not guilty as charged.164
O f his appearances before the Tydings committee, Lattimore reflected upon what he 
thought McCarthy’s remarks about the accused men and how it had gotten to the point of holding 
an investigation:
I read McCarthy’s speech, which had taken him more than four hours to deliver, and I 
realized that McCarthyism is not a thing to be fixed, it is an octopus to be fought. 
Psychologically, the very fact that I was innocent made the whole nightmare more 
paralyzing. The charges against me built up a circumstantial picture of a man who might 
have existed. I was not that man, but those were the charges I had to refute. If I was not 
careful, I might fall into a trap. People might think I was trying to defend myself against 
real charges.165
Lattimore was not so much defending himself of real charges-although they did in fact 
exist and may, in fact, have been at least partially true- as he was an expert speaking of
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practicality and reality, and being charged for his knowledge, rather than his sympathies. The 
manner of the staging o f the charges had intertwined the two. The reality of those living on the 
borders o f the Iron Curtain, or behind it, was important to understand.:
What a native o f central Asia saw across the soviet border was not Soviet propaganda. It 
was fact-unpalatable perhaps to Americans, but demonstrably true at that time. Neighbors 
of the Russians in Asia saw improvements of this kind in soviet territory, and were 
excited by them-especially the younger people. For these same people America , if they 
knew about it at all, was a fairy tale land unreal and far away. They had no way to use the 
things America stands for as a guide to action in the situations in which they actually 
,lived. . ..unless we find a way of handling this problem, America will become, for the 
growing generation of a large part of Asia, more and more an imaginary land, a land of 
daydreams, perhaps, but not a land that sets the standards o f what men do in their 
ordinary lives. Russia will become more and more the land of reality. We can only get 
into the lives of these people eventually, by the propaganda of action, things done by 
Americans that are beneficial to other peoples-not by the propaganda of words over radio, 
or even words and pictures in pamphlets and leaflets.166
Access to information, and the ability to determine for one’s self was the real issue 
Lattimore believed was at stake. A uniformity of belief could settle in, which would be 
detrimental to the United States. Edward P. Morgan, Chief Counsel of the Tydings Committee, 
and Lattimore antagonist, a member of the hearings, under the auspices of Hickenlooper, is 
referenced in the next passage:
It is one o f the basic assumptions on which American citizenship and patriotism have 
been built up that a man bom a foreigner can become a citizen as loyal as a native bom 
American. This assumption applies to a man bom, in say Russia, who first reaches 
America at age twenty eight. But the implication in Morgan’s question was that a native 
bom American who had spent most of his life in China until he was twenty eight might 
not be a loyal American when he returned to his own country.167
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Morgan is notable because he was a Washington insider, an attorney who, having been an 
aide to Hoover in investigations against subversive activity, was now on the Committee as a 
favor to Senator Green. 168During his questioning, Lattimore presented a case of McCarthyism, as 
it had come to be known, as a deadening, anti-intellectual, paranoid hypocrisy utilized by 
cowards and vipers who ganged up to attack hard working men and women. It would be unfair to 
either side to consider this as true in whole. Lattimore’s response speaks to the anxieties 
experienced by those accused by Tydings, McCarthy and others.
As such, Ordeal by Slander is an important volume in the relation between the media and 
their reportage of “McCarthyism.” Morgan’s actions demonstrated these dangers when he asked 
Lattimore4? . .has your thought been essentially what is best for the Chinese people, as 
distinguished from what might be perhaps best for the United States of America?” 169 Lattimore 
wrote that “one o f the dangers o f this is that a man may soon be in danger of being called a 
disloyal American if he thinks it would be all right for the Chinese people to have what is best 
for the Chinese people.” 170Here, issues o f colonialization and empire become evident. This is 
also important in understanding Lattimore, for with such comments, it is easy to believe he 
would have suggested allowing Korea to lose, and that, whether for political gain and ideology, 
or out o f misguided belief that “the people” would be better served, had some level of sympathy 
towards Communist takeovers in Asia.
Instead of investigating this, measures were taken to steer away from this, as testimony 
continued in the Congressional hearings. In late April and early May 1950, Freda Utley, a 
member of the Communist Party o f Great Britain, was scheduled to speak about Lattimore. but
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then excused from testimony in order to give her time to arrange the files she would testify on. 
Her answer and interaction with Tydings was met with exasperation, because of her lack of 
preparedness and the delay this caused in examining Lattimore. Utley also testified that her 
statements would be based on both Lattimore’s writings and utterances. Senator Tydings 
rightfully questioned her on the veracity o f these claims, to which she responded she would have 
supporting facts. There was then discussion of how the testimony would need to be delayed until 
the following Monday or Tuesday, but before that commenced, a new question was raised, of 
Lodge’s desire to question Lattimore in Executive Session.171 Senator Tydings and Senator 
Lodge spoke o f their eagerness to conclude the investigations but disagreed that the hearings be 
continued in the open, with Lodge saying:
Then that puts me in the position o f either being unable to get the 
answers to questions which I regard as essential to help me reach a conclusion, now 
will I allow the asking of questions which will hamper work of the investigative 
agencies and possibly besmirching the characters of innocent persons and possibly 
injure American position abroad. 172
Lodge’s eagerness seems to be grandstanding, as by this point in 1950, the 
investigations were so far underway that those who might have been guilty would not only have 
had time to have covered their tracks, but the continued presence of lightly documented 
accusations could be equally said to have damaged American position abroad, to say nothing of 
the perception that men like Joseph McCarthy had on American image in other parts of the 
globe, while Utley’s testimony had supported her earlier claims to McCarthy, which were 
supported by the FBI. The chief claim made by her, and the only one about which the FBI agreed
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with Utley, was that “Lattimore’s writings followed the Communist line.” 173 This was hardly 
proof o f Lattimore being the master spy that McCarthy alleged.
Budenz’s time as a professional witness neared its end. Many in both the upper and 
lower chambers grew weary of him. In May 1950, Senator David Chavez o f New Mexico said of 
Budenz that “this man has impeached and exposed himself as a devious, conspiratorial, warped 
personality.. .1 do not think he knows truth from falsehood anymore.” 174While Budenz’s star 
faded, McCarthy’s desire to be noticed would only grow. This was a desire shared by other 
Republicans.
In late April o f 1950, Senator Taft sensed that the real battle would be over President 
Truman’s foreign policy and mourned that “differences in the Republican Party are so great that 
it is hard for us to take a combative position on any particular aspect.” 175 This division is noted 
by historian John W. Malsberger, who “has documented a divide between those he labels ‘old 
guard obstructionists and new conservatives.’ ,76Malsberger is convinced that this was rooted in 
post-New Deal anxieties, while fellow historian Athan G. Theoharis, extrapolated by contending 
that the divide was three-fold, “the extremists were constant and sharp critics of the foreign 
policies of Roosevelt and Truman, the partisans less so and the moderates could be won over to 
bi-partisanship.” 177 With the Republicans fractured, extremism had the potential to go 
unchecked.
By the end of June 1950, McCarthy had become only slightly transparent with the FBI, 
giving documents that the FBI either already had or knew about and most of which “were
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discarded as false, meaningless, irrelevant, fraudulent, or hopelessly vague.” 178 In that same 
month, Stephen Spingam told President Truman that the administration had the capability "to 
counter and neutralize Communist activities in this country” because of the way in which "the 
FBI had placed ever-increasing emphasis upon the activities of Communists in our 
midst.” l79This reveals that much of the real “Red Hunting” was not happening with the Senate 
and House, but rather through the FBI.
As the case against Lattimore began to fray around the edges, many Democrats and 
some Republicans, in regards to McCarthy’s tactics, demonstrated “growing distaste...but to the 
loud acclaim of the American public, McCarthy continued to tantalize with hints of further 
sensational disclosures.” 180 On July 6, 1950, McCarthy addressed the War in Korea, then still 
being referenced as a police action. McCarthy again brought Owen Lattimore to attention. 
McCarthy began by speaking of domestic Communism, often directing his words towards 
President Truman:
The American people realize that we cannot invoke a moratorium on fighting 
Communists and traitors at home, any more than we can invoke a moratorium on fighting 
them abroad, without completely disastrous results.. ..Frankly, Mr. President, I think the 
Communists within our borders have been more responsible for the success of 
communism abroad than Soviet Russia has been responsible for that success. I strongly 
feel, and I do not think that there can be any question about it, that had it not been for the 
planners in our State Department, who went along 100 percent with Stalin in Poland and 
who went along 100 percent with him in Asia, the entire face of the world would have a 
different complexion as of today. I agree with the historian who once said T f this Nation 
is ever destroyed, it will not be destroyed by enemies from without but by enemies from 
within.’ Mr. President, in that connection I should like to call attention to what the great 
architect of our Far Eastern Policy had to say, not 2 or 5 years ago, but on the 17th day of 
July 1949, as quoted in Compass-Owen Lattimore, who had been advising the State 
Department-and this is a direct quotation ‘the problem in Korea is to allow Korea to fa ll 
but not to let it appear that we pushed her.’ That is the program that Acheson and his 
crowd accepted lock, stock and barrel. That is the program they put into effect, until 
President Truman made the sudden change of policy of 4 or 5 days ago. If the program of
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Own Lattimore-the program of allowing our friends to fall but not making it appear that 
we were pushing them-had not been bought and put into effect by the State Department, 
the blood of American boys would not be consecrating the hills and valleys of Korea 
today.181
This was the same Lattimore whom the State Department had used, sparingly, as a 
consultant, a fact not to be bothered with, and of whom, publically at this point in time, the worst 
that might be said about him was that like so many others, and despite-or perhaps because of-his 
affection for the Asian world, he was guilty o f naivete regarding popular movements in Asia. 
McCarthy was not finished, and turned his wrath on the press:
Mr. President, today the same columnists who have always headed the smear brigade 
against those who would expose Communists and traitors at home have now wrapped 
themselves in the American flag and are attempting to convince the American people-by 
some strange, twisted reasoning-that the best way to aid our fighting men is to protect the 
traitors who are responsible for sending them almost bare-handed against tanks in the 
mud of the valleys of Korea. As Samuel Johnson said ‘patriotism is the last refuge of a 
scoundrel.’182
McCarthy survived the collapse of the initial Lattimore case. He did this by “challenging 
Truman to open the government’s loyalty files.. .McCarthy insisted that the evidence to support 
his charges against the State Department could be found in the files.”183 Truman had blocked 
M cCarthy’s attempts at opening the files for months. McCarthy, in turn, played victim to the 
press, by stating that “you can be sure of this: if those files would prove that McCarthy was a 
liar, they would damn well be opened at sunrise tomorrow morning.”184 Yet, it can be said that 
even if Lattimore was not what he said he was:
Neither was he what McCarthy claimed he was, and had McCarthy proceeded with the 
great care and diligence the case demanded, he could have emerged vindicated. But 
McCarthy did not, and by inflating the Lattimore case in order to salvage his position he
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had instead damaged it. He had also damaged his relationship with FBI director Hoover, 
who was privately furious with McCarthy’s mishandling of the sensitive data he had 
supplied. In the end, McCarthy learned an important lesson: to be more careful in 
deciding who was a spy and who was merely a fellow traveler, Stalinist sympathizer, or a 
‘loyalty risk.’ But the behavior of Lattimore and his supporters communicated another 
less noticed lesson: while liberal opponents decried McCarthy’s methods as smear, 
distortion and misrepresentation, they were willing to do at least the same-and even 
worse-to discredit him .185
The interplay of politics and dissemination of information and disinformation, through 
media outlets, including print journals, magazines and newspapers, as well as radio, television 
and even films, books and plays, is important to understanding the phenomenon known as 
McCarthyism. It is one which takes its name from a man who came to an idea late, and who left 
after a comparably brief period. The focus on this one individual speaks greatly to American 
Culture and its obsession with celebrity. Robert Griffith wrote of the period, “if  the Cold War 
explained the objective circumstances from which McMarthyism erupted, it did not explain its 
style, rhetoric or mass appeal.” 186 It is not apparent that any one source or explanation can solve 
the answer to the why or how o f this question. Griffith suggests that the focus ought to be on 
understanding how the:
Political definition o f McCarthyism, the charge of ‘communism in government’ was not 
just a response to status anxieties or to the tensions o f the cold war, but was generated by 
the American political system. (McCarthy) rose to power because of a political dynamic 
created during the late nineteen forties by a band o f Republican partisans as they 
scrapped and clawed their way toward power.187
In this environment, McCarthy thrived. Yet, even in his early days, during the accusation 
against Lattimore, he was not allowed to run roughshod and completely unfettered. Through all 
this, McCarthy was not without his critics. “McCarthy was denounced of his charges July 20.
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1950, in words by fellow senators ‘unusually strong.. .which called attention once more to the 
constitutional immunity enjoyed by the members of the Senate and House of 
Representatives.’188McCarthy was held accountable, and by his fellow Senators. Why did the 
media present him as an unassailable villain, immune to the checks and balances of the system 
he seemed determined to undermine?
These immunities were an American tradition, which was of British origin and, directly, 
from British political tradition, “as Jefferson well stated, the immunity (for leaders) originated in 
England.. .It developed as a privilege asserted by the parliament of England against the 
prerogatives of the King, in order to fulfill its function as an independent branch of 
government.” 189 It was the same protection of which McCarthy had taken full advantage.
Those were the very rights which had led to McCarthy, with little initial evidence needed 
for presentation, in accusing Lattimore and starting the hearings with Hickenlooper, Lodge and 
Tydings. O f those three, Lattimore took exception to Hickenlooper’s questions to him, and 
remarked that Hickenlooper implied “any ‘allegation’ of leftism is proof and that ‘volumes of 
allegations’ must be proof of extreme leftism.” 190Considering this, Lattimore opined that “it 
implies a man o f ‘very brilliant and great ability’ is a tricky man-and this anti-intellectualism is, 
o f course, an essential part of the campaign for thought control and against independent 
thinking.” 191 Further, for Lattimore, this also “implies left is an absolute term., .but left of what, 
and left to when? A man can be left o f Taft, and still not a leftist to the majority of Americans. A
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man can be left of Roosevelt, and still, to most Americans, be neither dangerous or 
disloyal. ...” I92What was Lattimore onto?
The witch hunting o f which McCarthy is a part is recruited from ex-communists, and pro- 
facists, America Firsters, anti-semites, Coughlinites, and similar fringe fanatics of the 
political underworld. It was groups like these that Hitler used to run interference for him, 
causing the confusion and dismay that he and his real backers, the big time reactionaries, 
needed in order to take over the state. But these vanguards of facism cannot be dismissed 
as lunatics. Their purposes are diverse, but all of them lead up to the training and 
indoctrination of strong-arm groups. In the meantime, they flourish on dissension, turmoil 
and notoriety.. .their most important function is not to turn up real communists, most of 
who are already known to the FBI, but to assert brazenly that they have a sinister 
underworld, instinctive knowledge that the kind of person you are is the kind of person a 
communist is .. . .McCarthyism has not yet been successful in establishing thought control, 
but it is using well tried propaganda methods in its efforts to do so.193
No less a source than George Kennan, who served in the State Department as an expert 
on Russia for over twenty five years, and whose “X-Letter” became the bedrock of government 
policy regarding containment of Communism, believed that something sinister was about D.C. at 
this point in time. On April 17, 1951, Kennan lectured in Chicago that over the past year:
Myths and errors are being established in the public mind more rapidly than they can be 
broken down. The mass media are too much for us...M cCarthyism has already won, in 
the sense of making impossible the conduct of an intelligent foreign policy. The result is 
that there is no place in public life for an honest and moderate m an.. . 194
Kennan was not finished. As John Lewis Gaddis notes, Kennan, while addressing a 
crowd at the University o f Notre Dame, warned of lingering McCarthyism that it fed on 
contempt for artists and writers and described it as anti-intellectual. m ln May of 1954, at Notre
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Dame, and before the censure of Joseph McCarthy by the Senate, Kennan remarked of 
McCarthyism that:
If unchallenged, its practitioners would reduce the range of respectability to only 
themselves, the excited accusers.. .excluding anyone not engaged in the profession of 
denunciation... having lived for years in totalitarian states, I know where this sort of thing 
leads.196
Indeed Kennan did, for he had seen the rise of Stalin in Russia, and seemed to be 
comparing that totalitarian mindset to McCarthy. An important question to keep in mind was, 
how deliberate was this on the part of McCarthy, and how much of a role did media coverage 
have to do in persuading the American people into being for or against what Senator McCarthy 
agitated for? How unfair is it to call McCarthy, himself, totalitarian? How much of his message 
and actions were based in fact, and how much in grand self-promotion?
On August 1, 1950, McCarthy “read to the Senate an affidavit by one Willy Foerster 
alleging that in 1938 he brought a letter to Owen Lattimore from a man in Japan who was later 
executed by the Japanese as a Russian spy.” 197 What is interesting about this is how the media 
ignored this, “the Associated Press did not bother to put this item of ‘news’ on the wire, so 
McCarthy wrote a letter to every daily newspaper in the country complaining about the 
Associated Press’s action (or inaction).” 198 This was not the end of the battle, because the 
Associated Press said it had covered “all newsworthy aspects of the Senator's campaign but in 
this case it was concluded the Senator’s statement lacked news value.” 199 Combined with 
Lattimore’s earlier, though not known until later, use of Commintem channels, much doubt is 
cast on Lattimore’s innocence.
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Lattimore and McCarthy encapsulates the debate over speech, action and evidence as 
presented to the public through means o f mass communication. McCarthy serv es as a great 
example of an unfortunate figure in American Politics, the populist demagogue. Yet his example 
is more complex than a man who lied, cheated and bullied his way to the top, which is one 
interpretation of his life. McCarthy was neither the completely popular trailblazer, nor the utterly 
reviled villain some accounts make him out to be. As usual, the truth lies in the middle, and the 
job o f the historian is to illuminate the unvarnished facts.
Free Speech, Public Interest and National Security are more than buzzwords. They are 
signposts in the story of one of the most remarkable periods of United States History. What this 
period tells us about ourselves is important because its lessons are as relevant today as they were 
over sixty years ago. The first case against Owen Lattimore was not the end of Professor 
Lattimore, and was only the beginning of the comet-like Senatorial career of Joseph McCarthy. 
McCarthy would never completely forget about Lattimore, but he would move on.
In part, McCarthy did this because o f pressure from fellow Senators, ‘'whether or not 
other anti-communists openly opposed McCarthy (and some, particularly the liberal anti­
communists quite clearly did so) it is improper to automatically identify McCarthy with the 
entire anticommunist movement.”200 It is with this pressure in mind that McCarthy began to shift 
his attention elsewhere, to other issues within first the Truman administration and then that of 
Dwight David Eisenhower, and along the way, make friends and enemies on both sides of the 
aisle and across radio, film and television. Led by a man who, through a combination of bad 
judgment, eagerness to play to the crowd and a seeming inability to understand the damage he
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wrought to friend and foe alike, was unsuited to the task he had appointed himself. The 
McCarthy Era had only just begun.
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Chapter Three: Security, Enemies and Patriotism
As the first case against Owen Lattimore, under the Tydings Committee, was wrapping 
up its investigations, other investigations and measures were being put into place. One such was 
a security act, named after Democratic Senator Pat McCarran o f Nevada, “in February 1949, Pat 
McCarran introduced a bill to provide greater military aid to Chiang. Acheson opposed it, saying 
it would only prolong the hostilities and suffering.”201 This was met with scorn by Senators 
McCarran, Bridges, Wherry and Knowland, who “described the government’s White Paper of 
August-drafted by the State Department, it washed America’s hands of the outcome of the 
Chinese Civil War-as a whitewash.”202 This was the origin of the “betrayal” the China Lobby 
would not let die.
Senator McCarran had earlier tried to “sponsor a rider to an appropriations bill giving the 
Department o f State full authority to dismiss any employee suspected of
disloyalty...”203Undaunted by this failure, McCarran instead threw his weight behind the Mundt- 
Nixon bill, which had been debated since 1948, requiring all Communists to register. McCarran 
then “added to it other anti-communist provisions that had been floating around and maneuvered 
to turn this omnibus anti-Communist bill into the Internal Security Act.”204 It was a turning point 
in American politics.
The McCarran Internal Security Act passed the Senate by a vote of 70-7 in September.
1950. The Act required that:
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all Communist and Communist front groups register with the attorney general, set up a 
Subversive Activities Control Board to determine which organizations had to register, 
broadened the definition of espionage and sabotage, provided for the detention of 
suspected subversives in the event of a crisis.205
An anonymous Senator remarked “those who faced the electorate this year would be 
taking too great a risk if they voted right because of the popular lack of understanding and 
hysteria over the issue.,,206The lack of leadership was astounding. One ally of McCarthy who had 
begun to question him was Senator Margaret Chase Smith, Republican of Maine. She believed 
that “one of the main objectives of the federal government should be the exposure and 
eradication of communism in the United States...but had begun to question the ‘validity, 
accuracy, credibility and fairness o f McCarthy’s charges.”207 Smith showed remarkable poise 
and respect for the structure o f government through her hesitance to attack McCarthy, which was 
because:
she had been urged to do so by radio commentator Ed Hart and newspaper columnist 
Doris Fleeson.. .but hesitated because she thought it was up to Democratic Senators to 
respond to attacks on a Democratic administration. She finally decided to act, composed 
her statement, showed it to George Aiken (Republican-Vermont) and asked five other 
liberal Republican senators to join them.208
Shortly before the McCarran Act was passed, “Margaret Chase Smith and six other 
Republican Senators issued what they called a ‘Declaration of Conscience” in which “without 
mentioning any names it accused ‘certain elements’ of the Republican party of trying to gain 
victory through ‘the selfish exploitation o f fear, bigotry, ignorance and intolerance.”209Smith, as 
a new Senator, was taking a great risk, but:
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she believed in Senatorial courtesy, which McCarthy constantly flouted.. .a hardworking 
legislator who attended roll calls and was prepared for hearings...McCarthy was sloppy 
and shot from the hip....she liked facts and clarity, whereas McCarthy was a great 
obscurer and twister of facts. She thought his February 20th speech was character 
assassination.210
In an atmosphere which allowed McCarthy’s behavior, it is unsurprising that a bill such 
as The Internal Security Act would pass. Yet this is also the atmosphere that birthed McCarthy, 
who, until shortly before he had leveled his accusations against the State Department:
had little knowledge of Communism or interest in subversion, before deciding that he 
needed a defining issue for his re-election bid. At some point later in the process, he 
probably believed in what he was saying, but in two ways, his form of anti-communism 
is appropriately characterized as manipulative. First, unlike many nonpolitical 
anticommunists, McCarthy (and a number o f his Republican colleagues in the Senate) 
cynically utilized anticommunism in large part as a means of advancing their careers. 
Second, as part of career-driven manipulation, he often attacked individuals, even though 
he had absolutely no basis for believing they had communist connections.211
What is saddening, and further evidence of the lack of governmental leadership viz the 
McCarran Act, was how “the detention provision, or concentration camp amendment, was the 
contribution o f such legendary liberals as Hubert Humphrey, Paul Douglas and Herbert 
Lehman.” Truman had attempted to stop the McCarran Act, which he considered 
“Unconstitutional and unworkable, but in both houses of Congress, liberals and moderates joined 
conservatives in overriding the veto and six concentration camps were immediately built in order 
to house up to 26,500 prisoners.”212 Allying himself with the supporters of the McCarran Act, 
McCarthy would shift his attention specifically from Owen Lattimore to broader targets, as well 
as those who failed to support the McCarran Act.
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Nearly McCarthy’s first action was to go after Margaret Chase Smith. While never 
named in her speech, McCarthy knew of whom she spoke. On her way to deliver the speech, she 
met McCarthy and informed him that her coming words would be about him, but would not be 
named, at which he threatened the once vice-presidential hopeful with the withholding of 
Wisconsin’s electoral votes.213 In her speech, Smith said:
Those of us who shout the loudest about Americanism are all too frequently those who, 
by our own words and acts, ignore some of the basic principles of Americanism: the right 
to criticize, the right to hold unpopular beliefs; the right to protest; the right of 
independent thought.214
Reflecting on this period, former Democratic Senator Charles Edward Potter of Michigan 
recalled that in 1951:
McCarthy used his seniority and dumped her off the Senate Investigating 
Committee...when the Senate Subcommittee on Privileges and Elections under the 
chairmanship of Senator Guy Gillette attempted, in 1951, to determine whether expulsion 
proceedings should be instituted against Joe.215
Potter also revealed that:
Margaret Smith had objected vigorously as a member of the committee when McCarthy 
charged it with being guilty of ‘stealing from the taxpayers’ and of being ‘completely 
dishonest’ because it was trying to investigate his financial record.216
This example of McCarthy’s punitive nature is not shocking, but neither is the concern of 
political opponents in uncovering discrepancies with one another’s finances. While politics are 
real, and involve people and their lives, it is also a game, played to win; while criminal activity 
cannot be condoned, it would be naive to suggest that such cruel attempts are not commonplace. 
Nobody within the political sphere can remain there for long without "getting dirty” and nobody 
who achieves high office can do so without having stepped on a few necks on the way up the
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political ladder. For McCarthy, the media greatly assisted the public in seeing him in action. The 
media, however, was not McCarthy’s main objective.
The establishment of the McCarran Committee is not when McCarthy began his "Great 
Crusade” for he had already done that in Wheeling, West Virginia. It is often remembered, 
incorrectly, that McCarthy went after members of Hollywood’s inner circle. This is mostly 
untrue. As Thomas Doherty notes:
It was not the McCarthy Committee, but the McCarran Committee that investigated 
subversive content in motion pictures and television; and it was not McCarthy but a 
confederation of private organizations and special interest groups that purged television 
o f artists deemed ‘controversial personalities.’ McCarthy’s focus was mainly intramural, 
aimed at government, not media. The McCarthy committee (officially, the Senate 
Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations, chaired by McCarthy from 1953-1954) is 
most often confused with the House Committee on Un-American Activities...Perversely, 
McCarthy is given too much credit for McCarthyism.217
M cCarthy’s targets were government employees, not directors, actors, writers, producers 
and technicians. McCarthy is remembered “along with prescient politicians like Estes Kefauver, 
Richard Nixon and Dwight Eisenhower-who possessed a keen eye for the main chance of the 
new medium.”218 McCarthy was allowed to become a strong man, with a shiny new technology 
to spread his message.
McCarthy and McCarran would become increasingly involved in loyalty boards, then 
proliferating following the adoption of the Internal Security Act. As explained by Andrea 
Friedman:
While Loyalty boards often flattened out the complexity of an individual’s political life, 
collapsed ideologies and categories, and mistook dissent and progressive activism for 
disloyalty and subversion, they were, at least in part, responding to the reality of left
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unionism, in which workers rights advocates, anti-racism activists and communists, 
encountered and influenced each other .2I9
In this sense, what the McCarran Committee represented could be construed as risk 
management. The question was at what price for freedom and liberty. Unconcerned with such 
matters, McCarran and McCarthy proceeded with their investigations. What emerged was a 
rivalry between the Senate, led by McCarthy and McCarran, and the House. In January 1951, the 
Senate “established a subcommittee of the Judiciary Committee that was intended to rival 
HCUA: this was the Senate Internal Security Subcommittee, whose chairman in 1951 and 1952 
was Pat McCarran.”220 McCarran used his power to investigate
Officers in the Foreign Service who had warned that the Chiang Kai-shek government 
was weak and corrupt; of Owen Lattimore and the Institute of Pacific Relations; of 
subversive aliens; of Communism in youth groups; of subversive infiltration of radio, 
television, and the telegraph industry; passport policy; subversive control of five unions; 
o f espionage by Soviet-bloc diplomats; of Communist teachers; and o f the political 
records o f American employees of the United Nations.221
It is telling that McCarthy “was not even a member”222 of the McCarran investigations 
into Lattimore and the IPR. This was because “Republican elders still refused to trust him with 
any serious power and worked to keep him confined to his PSI satrapy.”223 PSI was the 
Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations, o f which McCarthy was now a senior member.
In December o f 1950, McCarthy had an altercation with journalist Drew Pearson, in the 
Sulgrave Club in Washington D.C. Pearson had been the journalist who had first published 
Lattimore’s name, a leak that most sources believe “came from hard-liners in the State
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Department.”224 After initially supporting McCarthy, Pearson had pulled away from the Senator, 
in part because o f a close friendship with frequent McCarthy target and Secretary of State, Dean 
Acheson, but also “because he was disgusted by the senator's vicious attacks on State 
Department personnel.”225 Pearson had revealed “the senator’s income tax troubles, his ‘quickie’ 
divorces, and his obnoxious behavior during the Malmedy probe.”226 All these were facts 
McCarthy wished had been left in the past, and in the case o f his income, was partly responsible 
for his removal of Margaret Chase from the Committee she had been assigned to.
It is important to understand Pearson, who wielded immense power in the media o f his 
day. He was described as:
A strong and fervent liberal, he was a political commentator, investigative journalist, 
gossip columnist, and blackmailer all rolled into one. No other single person, neither 
journalist or politician, looms as large in the effort to derail McCarthy-not even William 
Evjue. Virtually every scandal that opponents used to besmirch McCarthy’s reputation 
and brand him a shameless demagogue, from his ‘reckless smears’ o f Owen Lattimore to 
lying about his war record to his financial shenanigans with Lustron, can be traced to a 
Drew Pearson column.227
Pearson recalled the physical incident as being egged on by Mrs. Ansberry, who seated the two 
men closely at the same table during dinner in order to see what would happened, and Pearson 
overheard McCarthy telling his dining companion that his next speech “would be a blockbuster 
that would end Pearson’s career.”228 One o f the people at the table mentioned McCarthy’s tax 
problems, causing McCarthy, according to Pearson, “to put his thumb and index finger behind
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the nerves at the back o f my neck, gouging me as hard as he could, and said ‘you come out and 
we will settle this.’229 After being separated, dinner was finished at different tables.
Afterward, the two men met in the coat room following their meals. McCarthy smiled 
and said “Well, Drew, a pleasant evening, isn’t it?’ and then wheeled around and kneed Pearson 
twice in the groin-an instinctive move, the senator explained later, to protect him from 
assassins.”230 McCarthy’s attack continued, as he “floored him with an open-handed slap, at 
which point Richard Nixon burst onto the scene yelling ‘let a Quaker stop this fight’ grabbing 
M cCarthy’s arm and pulling him from the room.”231 McCarthy was unrepentant about the attack.
The newspapers had a field day, and on December 15, 1950, McCarthy took to the Senate 
floor, “protected by Senate immunity, he called Pearson a ‘Moscow-directed character assassin’ 
and launched an attack on Pearson’s sponsor, the Adam Hat Company, as being supportive of 
Communism.232 Soon after “Pearson filed a $5.1 million libel suit against McCarthy...which 
dragged on until it was dropped in 1956.”233McCarthy proved himself combative both in and out 
of politics and his feud with Pearson would haunt him for the rest of his career.
The dismissal of General MacArthur by President Truman, in April 1951, led McCarthy 
to attack General George C. Marshall. In January 1950, Senator Robert Taft had accused “a 
group within the State Department” of working to rid China o f Chiang-Kai-shek, a move 
McCarthy claimed was how “Acheson and Marshall had ensured that the Kremlin gained a
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friendly government in China and that America gained a bloody and pointless war in Korea."2j4 
McCarthy, reaching back to his earlier claims, contended that Marshall was the one:
who imposed an arms embargo and a truce when Chiang’s forces were at the height of 
their pow er.. .and the villains were John Patton Davies, John Stewart Service, Raymond 
P.Ludden and John M. Emerson at the State Department, as well as General Joseph 
Stillwell, Brigadier General Evans Carlson, Agnes Smeley (a journalist who befriended 
the Red Army during the Long March) and an academic expert, Owen Lattimore.235
In some other sectors, the view of how Communism operated was shifting, as noted by 
scientist Werner Von Braun during an article in the April 21, 1951 issue of The New Yorker.
Von Braun was quoted as saying “the difference in the Cold War and arms race with Russia and 
Communism would be that after the war, America looked for brains and Russia went after 
labor.”236This indicates a clear concern about numbers, and it is reasonable to consider that if 
Communism in the Russian style, the mode of Stalin and Lenin, was enacted by a large number 
of people interested in raw power, that this would alarm those in Washington, D.C. and their 
constituents. How this large workforce supposedly came to be would be one of the central 
questions o f McCarthy’s next major accusation.
On June 14, 1951, on the floor of the Senate, McCarthy read into the record a sixty- 
thousand word speech damming Secretary of Defense General George C. Marshall, which 
pushed McCarthy further into the spotlight and signaled the divide between his early career and 
his eventual fall from grace. Historian Ted Morgan noted that “there was no rational reason to go 
after this American icon. Perhaps Joe the giant-killer wanted to cut down to size one of the few 
American statesmen held above reproach.”237 The speech was not written by McCarthy, but
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instead written by “Forrest Davis, a deeply conservative onetime editorial writer for the 
Cincinnati Enquirer.”238 What is notable in McCarthy's attack on Marshall is both the tone and 
the content.
Richard Rovere wrote that, “the body o f the speech was not an attack on General 
Marshall’s patriotism. It was a study of Allied high strategy with a good deal of emphasis on 
General M arshall’s role.”239 Unlike the attack on Lattimore and the members of the IRP, 
McCarthy was not yet admitting to questioning the commitment to America that Marshall held, 
but asserting that he had made mistakes. McCarthy soon tried to prove that these mistakes were 
results of Communist infiltration within the government and military.
McCarthy allowed the trouble he had stirred to fester. Rovere, no friend to McCarthy, 
asserts of McCarthy’s attack on Marshall’s conduct in the Second World War and China that:
There was a case to be made against General Marshall; like a great many Americans of 
his time, he was unprepared for leadership in global strategy and global diplomacy. He 
was unable to see, as Winston Churchill, for one, could see, beyond the immediate 
conflict with fascism to the developing conflict with the Soviet Union and Communist 
China. This is only to say that while he served the republic well, he served it with 
somewhat less foresight than one can, with hindsight, wish he-and with him most of our 
war leaders-had shown.240
William F. Buckley Jr. and L. Brent Bozzell take a more serious view of McCarthy’s 
intent regarding Marshal:
McCarthy has said that he did not call Marshall a traitor. Strictly speaking, he is correct. 
And, in fact, a year after making his speech, McCarthy wrote; T f [M arshall].. .made 
mistakes, that is no disgrace. Only those who do nothing make not mistakes. To prove 
that Marshall made mistakes does not indict Marshall of being either incompetent or of
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following the Communist cause’; and to the direct question, ‘did you accuse Marshall of
being a traitor, McCarthy answered ‘no.’241
McCarthy was very careful, in one regard. By never directly accusing Marshall o f being 
either a Communist or a traitor, McCarthy gave himself what he thought was room to escape if 
the accusations against Marshall turned against him as they had against Lattimore. Again, 
Buckley and Bozell note that “it is unreasonable to conclude...that McCarthy was charging 
Marshall with anything less than pro-Communist. In so doing, McCarthy aroused more 
resentment than any other single act in his stormy career-save his attack on Philip 
Jessup.”242What McCarthy did was to “impugn Marshall’s loyalty on the grounds that, over a 
number of years, his policy decisions advanced the Communist cause.”243 This would be, as 
already noted, a pivotal moment in how McCarthy was perceived.
In particular, McCarthy took exception to the Marshall Plan for European Recovery and 
pointed to U.S. Communist Party leader Earl Browder’s book Our Path in War and Peace as 
“the blueprint...for indiscriminate benevolence abroad comprehended in the Marshal Plan...this 
massive and unrewarding boondoggle.”244 McCarthy then launched into his most hyperbolic 
section, mentioning “a conspiracy on a scale so immense as to dwarf any previous venture in the 
history o f man. A conspiracy so black that...its principles shall be forever deserving of the 
maledictions of all honest men.”243 McCarthy was desperate to link the many strings of his 
perceived conspiracy to “lose China” to Communism and the result o f this desperation began to 
lose him support in the Senate.
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For his part, “Marshall refused to comment. If he had to explain that he was not a traitor 
at this point in his life, he told friends, it was not worth the trouble. He retired that September at 
the age of seventy-one, disgusted with the political climate.”246 For McCarthy, the result of this 
initiated:
a slight drop in temperature among his Republican claque, a slight distancing to avoid 
contamination. On October 22, 1951, at a press conference in Des Moines, Senator Taft 
said bluntly ‘I don’t think one who overstates his case helps his own cause.. .his extreme 
attack against General Marshall was one of the things on which I cannot agree with 
McCarthy.247
Marshall chose the correct path by refusing engagement, “he seemed to be unaffected by 
the slander and hysteria swirling beneath him. Given his intense dislike of partisan politics, 
McCarthy’s attack may have reinforced his determination to retire as soon as possible.”248Soon 
after, Democratic Senator William Burnett Benton of Connecticut, chiefly known as the 
publisher o f the Encyclopaedia Britannica, decided the time was right to remove McCarthy from 
public life by attempting to have him expelled from the Senate.
Benton was “a founder of UNESCO... the Voice o f America and in 1945... became 
Assistant Secretary o f State, taking charge, appropriately, o f the department’s expanding 
overseas information program s.. .in 1949 he was selected to fill the seat of Raymond 
Baldwin.”249Benton therefore had a considerable resume outside either chamber of Congress 
and, seemingly, very little to lose by attacking McCarthy. It was Benton who:
As a rookie, raised his voice against M cCarthy...in March 1950, he had defended 
Acheson and Jessup. In May, he joined in the Democrats’ brief oratorical 
counteroffensive against McCarthy. In November, he won election to the last two years
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of Ray Baldwin’s term after a campaign in which he claimed to have 'faced up to the 
McCarthy issue in every speech.’250
The historian Arthur Herman suggests that
Benton.. .understood by profession what McCarthy understood by instinct: how much 
modem politics involved manipulation o f the mass media. The Benton and Bowles 
agency had transformed advertising on radio through singing commercials and product 
surveys.251
In Febmary 1951, saddened by the loss of Millard Tydings because o f the machinations 
of McCarthy,252 Benton had proclaimed that “the junior senator from Wisconsin is out to be the 
judge, jury and prosecutor of the State Department. By this appointment, he becomes his own 
kangaroo court.”253 Benton was outraged at the conduct McCarthy had displayed both in his 
accusations against members of the State Department but also his interference in the election 
campaigns o f his opponents.
Benton found himself pitched against McCarthy. McCarthy said that
While Benton was Assistant Secretary o f State, he worked hand in glove with the 
Crimson clique which have been so bad for America and so good for Communist Russia. 
The exact number he personally brought into government is not fully known at this time. 
No wonder he squeals and screams in panic as the McCarran Committee starts to uncover 
some o f them.234
In response, Benton calmly repeated his same line, that “I regard Senator McCarthy as a 
menace to our American way of life.”253It is worth noting that Benton was “a frequent television 
industry critic and proponent of FCC-supervised censorship.”236It is not to defend McCarthy that 
it must be said there is hypocrisy afoot when one censor goes after another for the same actions.
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When McCarthy accused members of Congress of having Communists on staff, Benton 
responded by saying
McCarthy should hand over to the United States District Attorney any evidence he has to 
support his charge that several members o f Congress have known Communists on their 
staffs. If he doesn’t turn over the evidence, he is derelict in his duty as a citizen and as a 
United States Senator. It is time that we put a stop to these reckless charges. He has never 
proved one of them.257
McCarthy then, in a letter-he refused to appear before them-told the Gillette 
Subcommittee on Elections and Privileges that “the Benton-type material can be found in the 
Daily Worker almost any day o f the week and will continue to flow from the mouths and pens of 
camp followers as long as I continue to fight against Communists in Government.”258McCarthy’s 
mistake was having announced this in Atlanta, and by association, linking Benton ally Tom 
Hennings. McCarthy had written a scathing letter to Hennings, made public, in which he linked 
Hennings and his staff directly to the Daily Worker.259 This was an act of which a fellow Senator 
said that:
McCarthy will never be got by the Bentons. McCarthy willnever be got, here, by the 
State Department. But a while back in June, he made a big mistake by attacking Marshall. 
He made a mistake down in Georgia the other day by asserting some senators have 
Communists on their payroll. But he made the biggest mistake of all now in taking on 
Tom Hennings. Tom is one of us.260
With this, McCarthy lost support among southern Democrats. As the election of 1952 
loomed, McCarthy went on Edward R. Murrow’s See it Now , early in 1952 and accused Benton 
of “hiding behind his congressional immunity To smear McCarthy’ and Benton responded by 
waiving his immunity. McCarthy promptly sued him for two million dollars in libel.'*261 It was a
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futile case, and as such, McCarthy launched into an investigation of Benton, including prompting 
investigations, where he “refused to appear, because he would have been subject to perjury 
charges if  he lied under oath.”262 McCarthy finally provided what he claimed was proof, in the 
form of exhibits “proving Benton was a ‘propagandist’ who had been ‘paralleling’ the 
Communist party line for years.”263 The Gillette Committee continued weakly investigating, 
amounting to absolutely nothing o f consequence.
In m id-1952, McCarthy, using an especially faulty syllogism, asserted that “if the Daily 
Worker proved that Communists hated McCarthy, and Benton hated McCarthy, what did that 
make Benton?”264 Benton’s hopes o f re-election were dashed. Not so much by McCarthy, but by 
his own inability to capture the public’s attention and do anything about McCarthy. Benton’s 
parting remark was that he believed “a young and militantly conservative Yale graduate named 
William F.Buckley Jr, who had published a newsletter attacking Benton’s record as pro- 
Communist, was ‘a potentially dangerous young man.”265 It seemed that McCarthy was winning, 
but the truth was that his critics were simply not speaking as loudly or effectively as his 
supporters.
The 1952 Presidential election had become the battleground on which the results of 
McCarthy’s accusations against Marshall largely played out. Having withstood, if  barely, 
Benton’s attempt, McCarthy now had to stand up to growing dissatisfaction within his own party 
and a lack o f support from the very top.
Eisenhower, whose ties were to the moderate Eastern wing of the party, disliked 
McCarthy. But he also shrank from confronting him. The defining moment occurred
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during the election campaign when Ike’s political advisors forced him to delete a 
favorable reference to George Marshall from a speech he was going to give in 
Milwaukee. McCarthy had attacked Marshall in June 1951 when he delivered a sixty 
thousand-word speech accusing the distinguished military leader of participating in the 
Democratic administration’s conspiracy to betray both Eastern Europe and China to the 
Communists. Though McCarthy’s diatribe was part of a broader GOP campaign against 
Truman’s handling o f the unpopular Korean War, it was one thing to criticize the 
president. It was another to blast someone as eminent and widely respected as Marshall. 
And many republicans, as well as Democrats, felt McCarthy had gone too far.
Eisenhower was among them. The Republican presidential candidate despised the 
Wisconsin senator but he did not want to divide the party by taking him on. So he limited 
his campaign statements to generalities about decency and fair play when his handlers 
added an unwanted appearance in Wisconsin to his schedule, Ike decided to use the 
opportunity to praise Marshall and condemn the way McCarthy attacked him. At the very 
last minute, however, he pulled the passage from his Milwaukee speech the professional 
politicians in his entourage had convinced him that such a direct rebuke to McCarthy 
might split the Wisconsin GOP and lose to the state in November. Ike’s reluctance to 
confront McCarthy would continue after the election.266
McCarthy nonetheless took advantage of the July 4, 1952 Republican National 
Convention, in Chicago, and performed what:
liberals would later dismiss as coup de theatre.. .four ringing sentences, each punctuated 
with thunderous approval: T say one Communist in a defense plant is one Communist too 
many. One Communist on the faculty of one university is one Communist too many. One 
Communist among the American advisers at Yalta was one Communist too many. And 
even if  there were only one Communist in the State Department, that would still be one 
Communist too many.’267
The result was a flurry o f activity from the press. Drew Pearson’s assistant Jack 
Anderson “co-wrote a scurrilous little book, McCarthy: The Man, the Senator, the Ism , and 
interviewed neighbors from Grand Chute to scrape together evidence that McCarthy had been a 
bully and liar even as a child.”268 The New York Post published an “anti-McCarthy series that 
dredged up stories about Quaker Dairy, his ‘quickie divorces’ and even accused him (falsely) of
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having a homosexual on his staff in 1947.”269 The gender-attack on McCarthy is among the most 
interesting and telling o f all the attacks by or against the Senator.
O f this, Andrea Friedman writes that:
McCarthy did not introduce the practices and policies of political repression and sexual 
oppression that constituted the domestic cold war, and many of those practices and 
policies outlasted him. Nonetheless, he inhabits our memories as their most visible 
representation... The smearing of senator McCarthy reveals much about the sexualization 
of cold war politics....demonstrates that cold war liberals not only subscribed to the 
cultural logic of the lavender scare; they employed some o f its tactics to pursue their own 
ends.. .cold war liberals established their anti-Communist credentials by embracing a 
rhetoric of masculine virility.270
Ellen Schrecker contends that McCarthy simply used this rhetoric to further his own
cause:
Homosexuality was so far beyond the realm of acceptability that it rarely figured in any 
discussion o f the CP’s sexual practices. There were, it is true, intimations that 
Communism was somehow effeminate. Joe McCarthy led the charge with his diatribes 
against the "Communists and queers’ in the State Department and his macho disdain for 
its lead, "the Red Dean [Acheson] of Fashion.’ But class antagonisms shaped McCarthy’s 
language as much as homophobia did.271
This was the result of McCarthy having, in the words of Richard Rovere “discovered that 
homosexuality was regarded as a factor in security judgments, and he worked this for what it was 
w orth.. .it gave lesser demagogues.. .a comer o f McCarthyism to work for themselves.”272 This 
was an attack that McCarthy himself would endure.
In July 1952, McCarthy had angered the publisher of the Las Vegas Sun. Hank 
Greenspun, by “calling him an ex-Communist and Army deserter. Greenspun paid him back by 
running articles claiming that ‘it is common talk among homosexuals in Milwaukee who
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rendezvous at the White Horse Inn that Sen. Joe McCarthy has often engaged in homosexual 
activities.5,273 That McCarthy quickly married his long-time assistant, Jean Kerr, shortly after 
these allegations, did not help his protestations.
McCarthy was not without support. Ahead of his re-election, McCarthy had cast his light 
on new targets. He also found new allies, among them a bright pair o f young men from a family 
in Massachusetts. John and Robert Kennedy were the sons of Joseph Kennedy, a businessman 
and former Ambassador to the United Kingdom, who McCarthy had known since the late 1940s. 
As M. Stanton Evans tells the story “Jack Kennedy had entered the hardline anti-Communist lists 
before the 1950 arrival o f McCarthy, denouncing Owen Lattimore, John K. Fairbank, the IPR 
and the Acheson policy in China in terms McCarthy himself could not have faulted.”274 Robert 
would become, and remain, the closest o f the brothers to Senator McCarthy, despite a relatively 
short official relation to him.
Robert Kennedy worked for McCarthy from December 1952 until July 1953, at which 
point he resigned. Instead of becoming the Senator’s chief legal counsel, McCarthy had opted to 
go with another young man, Roy Cohn, who “was all o f twenty-five years old but already a 
veteran Communist-hunter and in certain circles well regarded.. .Cohn was the son o f a 
Democratic judge from New York C ity .. .Jewish, observant.. .part of the Ed Flynn 
Machine.”275The choice o f Cohn makes sense and yet can be shown as one o f McCarthy’s 
greatest blunder. Cohn’s credentials included:
A Liberal Democrat by upbringing and affiliation, he now developed considerable anti- 
Red expertise by working on the trials of Communist Party Leaders, a grand jury 
investigation of suspected American Communists employed at the United Nations, a
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perjury indictment of Owen Lattimore and, by his own account the most traumatic, he 
was part of the prosecutorial team that secured the conviction of Julius and Ethel 
Rosenberg for espionage conspiracy.276
Despite all this, rumors had dogged Cohn for years about his sexual orientation, and after 
McCarthy was elected to a second term, these allegations would once again be used against 
McCarthy by his critics, and by McCarthy against those same critics. What McCarthy had done 
in the year and a half since attacking General Marshall had been to shield himself from one blow 
after another, brought on largely by his own immense talent for grandstanding and overreaching. 
During this period, McCarthy partially lost sight of the goal of righting the wrong, in his mind, of 
“losing China” to Communism.
During the Presidential Campaign of 1952, in August of that year, a reporter named 
Murray Kempton, of The New Yorker, asked General Eisenhower about the accusations against 
General Marshall. The response by Eisenhower is telling, and reveals a deep level of disgust with 
outrages within his party.
‘General’ Kemp asked, ‘what do you think of those people who call General 
Marshal a living lie?’ Eisenhower’s face flushed beet red. He jumped from behind 
his desk and shook his finger at Kempton. His voice was angry and harsh. ‘How 
dare anyone say such a thing about General Marshall, who was a perfect example 
o f patriotism and loyal service to the United States. I have no patience with 
anyone who can find in his record of service for this country anything to
* . . •'771criticize.
The election of Dwight David Eisenhower as President of the United States brought 
about a new set o f challenges. No longer could McCarthy attack a Democratic administration. He 
was left with either the ghosts o f the distant past, the remnants of the previous administration or 
those who were not in agreement with him within his own party. McCarthy had largely left his
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old nemesis, Owen Lattimore, to the McCarran Committee, who in December 1952, coinciding 
with Cohn’s involvement “was indicted on seven counts of perjury stemming from his testimony 
to the Senate Internal Security Subcommittee. In May 1953, four of the seven perjury counts 
were dismissed by U.S. District Court Judge Luther W. Youngdahl, and the other three counts 
declared of doubtful materiality.”278 Yet, a Republican president had been sworn into office and 
McCarthy’s power seemed to assure him and his accusations of a continued presence.
Eisenhower, however, was no friend of McCarthy, “a timid chief executive, Eisenhower 
wanted to avoid making enemies, particularly in Congress. Orders went out telling members of 
the administration not to question McCarthy-and those like Stassen who did were publically 
humiliated.”279Eisenhower was biding his time, while other Republican leaders hoped to 
minimize McCarthy and the reputation he was giving the party. As such, in January 1953 “he 
was given the chair o f the Government Operations Committee, a panel given to humdrum
chores Senator William Jenner of Indiana would lead the Internal Security Committee while
Taft claimed ‘we’ve got McCarthy where he can’t do any more harm.”280 The chains did not 
long hold McCarthy, who “took command of the Permanent Subcommittee on 
Investigations...whose loose mandate let McCarthy lead it anywhere, and named Roy M. Cohn 
chief subcommittee counsel.”281 McCarthy was going to step up his program, but it was a 
program in need of new direction, or, perhaps, a recommitment to prior direction.
To this end, Michael Paul Rogin suggests that McCarthyism was “significantly not a 
fascist movement. It lacked an economic program, was free of anti-Semitism, did not challenge
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local elites and provided no physical violence. McCarthyism grew out of rural politics."282 This 
explained why McCarthy’s base was always in the Midwest and why the loss of the southern 
Democrats was such a blow to his ambitions. As McCarthy took control of the ISS, he would 
have to navigate these realities, aware of them or not.
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Chapter Four: Broadcast News, Dishonorable Discharge 
Starting in 1953, Senator McCarthy once again took aim at the State Department by 
going after its broadcasting arm. The Voice Of America service, then administered by the State 
Department's United States Information Agency, came under renewed criticism-McCarthy had 
spoken o f them since 1950-for their broadcasts being slanted in favor of Communism. The 
specific charges McCarthy leveled, in February 1953, were:
First, two powerful radio transmitters were deliberately being built where they would not 
be effective. Second, 'very sinister influences’ were trying to stifle anti-Communist 
propaganda broadcasts to Latin America. Third, Flebrew-language broadcasts to Israel 
had been canceled as part of a ‘pattern’ of aiding the Communist cause. Fourth, the 
director o f religious programming was an atheist.283
The Voice o f America had a history going back to 1942. It had in 1953 received “a fifty 
million dollar Congressional appropriation for a worldwide ring of transmitters designed to 
penetrate the Iron Curtain and reach every comer of the globe.”284 According to Ellen Schrecker, 
the VO A was “an unhappy amalgam of vociferously anti-Communist East European emigres and 
idealistic New Dealers left over from the Office of War Information, tom by a struggle over 
whether it should be an objective news outlet like the BBC or a more overtly propagandistic 
one.”283 The conflict within the VO A allowed McCarthy to expand his review of its practices 
because each camp was willing to destroy the other to get what it wanted.
Republicans had been eyeing the Voice o f America and the Information program since at 
least 1945, with party leaders convinced that they were “full of Communists, left-wingers, New 
Dealers, radicals and pinkos.”286McCarthy now attempted to go after the flow of information. By
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attacking the VOA and IP, McCarthy was calling attention to agencies involved in the 
dissemination of information around the globe, including Eastern Europe and Asia.
The deeper Roy Cohn and his assistant, Gerard David Schine, involved themselves with 
the investigations, the more their focus with VOA seemed to change. According to Richard 
Rovere, “almost the first thing Cohn and Schine did was move to New York, where Schine had a 
suite in the W aldorf Towers. There they interviewed underground members, and there, later, they 
examined the people the underground had fingered.”287 The ‘underground’ was The American 
Underground, one of the factions within VOA, and which was “organized by a Rumanian 
refugee named Paul Deac, and had begun forwarding information about ‘subversive’ employee 
to Senator McCarthy and his friends in the press-Howard Rushmore, Ralph de Toledano and 
George Sokolsky.”288Throughout the investigation, McCarthy had made use of television to 
broaden the audience his message reached.
McCarthy turned the hearings of his subcommittee into something of a traveling circus, 
where McCarthy “usually in Washington, or New York, occasionally further afield in locations 
such as Albany and Boston, chaired myriad hearings-closed hearings, open hearings, executive 
sessions, one-man hearings, and full committee hearings.”289Among those called to session was 
author Howard Fast. Questioned by Roy Cohn, Fast refused to answer Cohn’s query about Fast’s 
past as a member of the Communist Party on First and Fifth Amendment grounds, and reiterated 
the point when asked about which o f his books were published while a member of the 
CP.290McCarthy continued in Washington, where from March 3-6, 1953, he “probed the record
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of Reed Harris, deputy administrator for the State Department’s Internal Information 
Administration, and acting administration of the Voice of America."29'The investigation into 
Voice o f America was merely an excuse to get into the files o f the International Information 
Agency.
On February 23, 1953, a program manager named Alfred Puhan “accused Harris of trying 
to eliminate the entire VOA Hebrew language service, which was beamed to Israel-at a time of 
anti-Semitic purges behind the Iron Curtain.”292 During March hearings on Harris, “Raymond 
Kaplan, a forty-two-year-old Voice of America engineer, jumped in front o f a truck and was 
killed near the MIT campus in Cambridge.” This is the only time in the entire history of 
M cCarthy’s career where a suicide was in any way directly linked to his actions.
The details are that “Kaplan was the liaison man between MIT and the Voice when the 
sites for the Baker transmitters were chosen. The coroner ruled that he killed himself out of fear 
that he would be called before the McCarthy Committee.”293 This was because of Kaplan leaving 
“a letter for his wife and son, where he wrote: ‘ I am the patsy in any mistakes m ade.. .once the 
dogs are set on you, everything you have done since the beginning o f time is suspect.. .1 can’t 
take the pressure any more.”294 Some considered it murder, giving as evidence that Kaplan “had 
seemed eager to testify and had made a hotel reservation in Washington in case he was held 
overnight.”295 It is just as likely that Kaplan had an accident as committed suicide but such is the 
mythic power o f terror surrounding McCarthy that it is easy to believe the worst and attribute it 
to that mighty force called McCarthyism.
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McCarthy took this opportunity to say that “Mr. Kaplan had no fear of this committee 
whatsoever’ and added that sinister forces, not suicide, had probably done him in.”296This 
statement was followed shortly thereafter by Cohn and Schine’s book-burning tour o f the 
Information Program’s overseas libraries. McCarthy’s investigation of Harris ended in a 
televised showdown which
exemplified the scattershot injustice of the video courtroom. The hearing opened at 10:30 
and was scheduled to conclude, by prior agreement between ABC and McCarthy, at 
12:30, at which time ABC affiliates were to resume local programming. Having 
complained o f unfair treatment during his previous televised testimony, Harris was 
promised an opportunity to read a written statement on air. However, he was not called to 
testify until late in the morning and did not begin reading his statement until 12:23. At 
1230, ABC cut the feed to permit local affiliates to return to regularly scheduled 
programming, thus interrupting Harris mid-exculpation. (Only Washington affiliate 
WMALV-TV stayed with the Harris statement., .the decision by ABC to cut off Harris’s 
testimony incited a mini-‘equal time’ imbroglio. Suspecting bias, the viewers demanded 
that Harris be give airtime to respond to McCarthy, ‘the episode showed more clearly 
than anything else how both Senator McCarthy and television are putting show business 
considerations above the minimum canons of fair play and responsible journalism’ 
protested Jack Gould.297
McCarthy had reached what was the absolute peak o f his powers in the Senate when, in 
March o f 1953, as his investigation o f VOA concluded, he “forced the State Department to 
rescind a directive to Voice employees permitting them to decide for themselves whether they 
wished to talk informally with committee staff members in the absence of a Senator.”298 Further 
it was ordered that “Henceforth, all employees would be expected to cooperate fully in all o f the 
Committee’s work. McCarthy also induced the State Department to forbid the Voice of America 
to quote Communists even if such quotation would serve its purposes.”299 It was in this 
atmosphere that Schine and Cohn embarked on their embarrassing tour of Europe.
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Between April 4 and April 21 of 1953, Schine and Cohn went to Europe and had stops in 
“Berlin, Frankfurt, Munich, Bonn, Vienna, Belgrade, Athens and Rom e...the press coverage of 
dozens o f reporters and photographers, followed the pair from city to city, pouncing on 
everything they did.”300 One example was
railing against economic extravagance...and wound up personifying it-apparently at 
government expense.. .despite receiving $2,000 in counterpart funds, the pair went on a 
huge spending spree, charged everything to the American Embassy and then ran out on 
their hotel bill.301
The purpose of the trip was “to purge the State Department’s overseas libraries, which 
harbored, so the Senator claimed, thousands of subversive books by ‘Communists, pro- 
Communists and former Communists, anti-anti-Communists.”302 This resulted in new guidelines, 
and “an outright ban on books by ‘any controversial persons, Communists, fellow travelers, et 
cetera.’ Within a day, someone had deleted the ‘any controversial persons’ but the ‘et cetera’ 
remained.”303Among the items burned were works by “Whittaker Chambers, NAACP head 
Walter White and the Secretary of State’s own cousin, diplomatic historian Foster Rhea Dulles. 
For lack o f storage space in a few installations, some of the discarded items were burned.”304 The 
result was a black eye on the Senate. Schine and Cohn slunk back to Washington, D.C. to hide 
behind McCarthy, who found himself under renewed assault for overstepping his bounds with 
his recent investigations.
In the middle of this battle, McCarthy found himself a potential nominee for President of 
the United States, with major publications suggesting it:
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Newsweek and the New York Times were speculating that McCarthy was aiming for the 
White House in 1956. Fearing for the nation, former President Truman made a nationally 
televised speech in which he accused This Administration' of'sham eful demagoguery' 
and defined McCarthyism as a ‘horrible cancer [that] is eating at the vitals o f America.' 
Even Republicans began to grow nervous. Eisenhower’s brother publically described 
McCarthy as ‘the most dangerous menace’ to the nation.305
At the same time, the Korean War was coming to a close. McCarthy had long railed 
against American involvement in Korea. Former Secretary of State Dean Acheson had claimed 
that “Korea saved us” because o f how it convinced Congress to increase defense spending. 
Between 1947 and 1950, defense spending had “never exceeded $60 billion; after 1953, it never 
fell below $143 billion...an increase of $200 million.”306 Military concerns loomed large in the 
mind o f the public, a fact upon which McCarthy would soon capitalize, because as the United 
States involvement in Korea ended, so did the public’s immediate concern with matters in Asia, 
the platform upon which McCarthy had built his reputation.
That platform, the “Loss o f China” and the parties he held responsible, within the State 
Department, were never far from McCarthy’s thoughts at any time during any of his myriad 
investigations. McCarthy’s armor began to show chinks when in 1953, Eisenhower and Secretary 
o f State John Foster Dulles, backed Charles Bohlen as ambassador to the Soviet Union over 
McCarthy’s protests, yet did not “back up foreign aid administrator Harold Stassen in March 
1953 when he lashed out against McCarthy for having ‘undermined’ the nation’s foreign 
policy.”307 This demonstrated the delicate balance Eisenhower was trying to achieve, because he 
was aware that:
moderate Republicans had come to believe that the Wisconsin Senator was hurting the 
administration. Stassen, after all, had once been close to McCarthy and had helped him
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block the 1951 nomination of Phil Jessup to the UN. If Eisenhower would not back 
someone with such strong political credentials as his own foreign aid administration, 
McCarthy might well become unstoppable.308
Eisenhower was playing a long game with McCarthy, and people would have noticed the 
chinks in the armor if McCarthy had not been so terrifying for so long. Eisenhower intended to 
allow McCarthy to hang himself, and told his brother Milton Eisenhower, “I just w on't get into a 
pissing contest with that skunk.”309 Over the next year, hanging himself is precisely what 
happened as the Senator from Wisconsin used his committee and the medium of television to 
place himself at center stage in a crusade over a cause that fewer and fewer cared about.
On June 19, 1953, after unsuccessful last-minute appeals, the Rosenbergs were executed. 
None rejoiced over this more than McCarthy and Surine, who were out to get all the 
traitors, including Lattimore. Surine was working on a bill for McCarthy to introduce that 
would cover Lattimore’s major crime, ‘policy treason.' As Lou Nichols reported this new 
offense ‘by this Surine means an instance where through manipulation of top-level policy 
which would deliver a whole country o f group o f nations as contrasted against an 
individual act of espionage or sabotage.310
This led to the so-called Fifth Amendment Communists. O f these, McCarthy said “a 
witness’s refusal to answer whether or not he is a Communist on the grounds that it might 
incriminate him is the most positive proof obtainable that the witness is a Communist.”31 'This 
led to great abuses of the Constitution, where the accused had no true recourse to address the 
accusations they faced, and allowed “committees to ply reluctant witnesses with damaging 
questions in the confident expectation that they could not answer them.”312 Witnesses had no 
alternatives, and McCarthy basked in the glow of the attention he received.
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Over the spring and summer of 1953, McCarthy tantalized the public through the media 
by "‘barring them (the media) from less fruitful sessions on ‘security grounds' then giving his 
account of what happened. Thus a witness who invoked the Fifth turned up in the afternoon 
papers as ‘a leading espionage agent.’313 Over that spring and summer, the story o f Harry Dexter 
White, who passed away in 1948, was brought back into the spotlight.
When asked if this was a result of McCarthyism, President Eisenhower responded that “I 
do not particularly understand the term and haven’t another word to say about the matter.”314 
Cedric Belfrage writes that this is evidence of how “Although McCarthy had nothing to do with 
the White affair.. .McCarthyism was now the word for what caused the distress.”313 In late 
September 1953, McCarthy, having entered the lexicon, turned his attention to Fort Monmouth, 
New Jersey, and signaled the beginning of the end o f his career.
On October 12, 1953, McCarthy released a statement regarding Fort Monmouth. In this 
statement he claimed that he had “found traces of extremely dangerous espionage.. .striking at 
our entire defense against atomic attack.”316 McCarthy then claimed that “top secret’ documents 
from Fort Monmouth showed up in East Germany; at another briefing, McCarthy surmised that 
the spy ring set up by Julius Rosenberg ‘may still be in operation.’317 The result was massive 
newspaper and television coverage. McCarthy’s relations with the Army were already frosty, 
given his attack on General Marshall. These new allegations did little to engender any further 
affection.
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Related to the Army investigations was the case of Milo Radulovich, who came to 
greatest notice when the October 23, 1953 episode of the CBS series See It Now , hosted by 
journalist and broadcaster Edward R. Murrow, examined what Radulovich, a Dexter, Michigan 
based Air Force Reserve officer, had endured because of the climate of the period, one which 
had seen the McCarran Act adopted and which allowed McCarthy to operate in the manner to 
which he had become accustomed.
Within the program itself, neither McCarthy, who was not directly involved, or 
McCarthyism was mentioned, and Radulovich was presented as “an Everyman.. .and as in the 
movies, the strength of character of the common man conquers his persecutors in the last act.”318 
Murrow showed his audience what Radulovich was accused of: guilt by association. In this way, 
the program became a warning against the actions o f McCarthy and his followers. As Murrow 
explained through Radulovich’s own words:
A military security board has recommended Radulovich be severed from the service as a 
security risk because he has ‘maintained a close and continuing relationship’ with his 
father and sister. Radulovich is fighting the decision, he says, because ‘anybody labeled 
with a security risk in these days-especially in physics or meteorology-simply won’t be 
able to find employment in his line of work.319
Fred Friendly, Murrow’s producer and partner, and Murrow himself, felt this case was 
vital. Murrow said, in a plea to his audience as much as to the government:
We believe that the son shall not bear tie inequity of the father-even though that inequity 
be proved and in this case it was no t.. .whatever happens in this whole arena of the 
relationship between the individual and the state, we will do it ourselves. It cannot be 
blamed upon Malenkov or Mao Tse Tung, or even our allies. And it seems to us-that is, 
Fred Friendly and myself-that this is a subjected that should be argued about endlessly.320
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Five weeks later, Harold E. Talbott, Secretary of the Air Force, appeared on See It Now. 
and announced that “it is consistent with the interests of national security to retain Lt.
Radulovich with the United States Air Force Reserve. He is not in my opinion a security risk."321 
This was a major achievement for a television program to impact policy, and heralded a shift in 
coverage of McCarthy. It was but one of many blows to Senator McCarthy beginning in the fall 
of 1953.
In early November 1953, Cohn and McCarthy blundered. G. David Schine “the 
subcommittee’s unpaid consultant, received his draft notice.”322 Instead o f encouraging him to 
serve, McCarthy and Cohn meddled. “Despite efforts by McCarthy and, more specifically, Roy 
Cohn to secure a special assignment or direct commission for Schine. In early November, he was 
inducted as a private.”323 The timing was suspicious, because “at the same time the Senator and 
his aides were seeking unusual privileges for private Schine, the Army was trying to convince 
McCarthy to ease off on the Monmouth investigation.”324 The Eisenhower Administration saw 
trouble ahead and proceeded with caution.
In November 1953, Eisenhower wrote Attorney General Brownell that ‘we must search 
out some positive way to put ourselves on the side o f individual right and liberty as well 
as on the side o f fighting Communism to the death.. .the Communists are a class set apart 
by themselves. Indeed, I think they are such liars and cheats that even when they 
apparently recant and later testify against someone else for his Communist convictions, 
my first reaction is to believe that the accused person must be a patriot or he wouldn’t 
have incurred the enmity of such people. So even when these ‘reformed’ Communists 
have proved useful in tracking down some o f their old associates, I certainly look for 
corroborating evidence before I feel too easy in my mind about it.’325
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Also in November 1953, a dentist named Irving Peress came to McCarthy's attention. In 
October of 1953, Peress had made Captain in the United States Army. In November, Peress, 
“claimed ‘federal constitutional privilege’ on all questions relating to membership in subversive 
organizations. In January 1953, he was called to active duty and shipped to Fort Lewis, 
Washington for further assignment to the Far East Command.”326 The Peress case would become 
the entry point of the Army-McCarthy hearings.
What McCarthy was interested in with Peress was “that the Army bureaucracy and its 
own loyalty board had totally botched Peress’s case-not only permitting him to stay in the Army, 
in clear violation of the law, but actually promoting him.”327 McCarthy revealed to the public 
that “Peress had never been questioned about his background by a board o f inquiry or a security 
officer. He could not know that the Army had not asked because it already was aware of Peress’s 
past, and the Army was not going to enlighten McCarthy.”328 The stage was set for a pitched 
battle between McCarthy and the Army.
Regarding the Army-McCarthy hearings, David Caute writes that:
The final act o f hubris was to take on the Army, charging that in the highest reaches of 
the Pentagon, Communist sympathizers were shielding Soviet spies, and that in order to 
protect them Secretary o f the Army Robert T. Stevens had attempted to blackmail and 
smear McCarthy and his loyal staff.329
McCarthy considered the case of Irving Peress and his promotion as having given him 
“the key to Communist infiltration o f our armed forces.”330Issues of loyalty and freedom of 
speech can be found within the case o f the Army-McCarthy hearings and with the history of the
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various investigations by Senator McCarthy. Considering a time and place where the McCarran 
Act had led to further loyalty boards, and where invoking a Constitutional right was seen as 
proof o f treasonous behavior, scholar Edward A. Shills offers this commentary:
Oaths o f allegiance are part of the ceremonial o f solidarity. They carry no weight in the 
protection of the security o f a country because that must be concerned with the gravely 
alienated. Loyalty oaths are part of the process o f drawing the line around the society of 
the loyal and excluding the disloyal from participation in that society. Even when the 
products of espionage are considerable, it is still far from certain that espionage is either 
very harmful to its victims or very beneficial to its instigators. The knowledge that one is 
penetrating the secrets of the other side is reassuring and strengthening to the morale of 
the power which gains the secrets. It is more doubtful whether the knowledge gained by 
espionage makes so much difference...331
Peress had requested a discharge, one day after McCarthy demanded his court-martial, on 
February 2, 195 4.332 Two weeks later, McCarthy called:
Brigadier General Ralph W. Zwicker before the subcommittee and demanded from him 
the names of all the officers who had been involved in Peress’s discharge. When Zwicker 
refused on advice o f army counsel John Adams, McCarthy berated the officer as ‘not fit 
to wear that uniform’ and charged that he ‘did not have ‘the brains of a five-year-old.’333
McCarthy would not fall based solely on the ire o f the Army, alone. Instead, his bullying 
of a government employee, Annie Lee Moss, coupled with anti-McCarthy broadcasts by Edward 
R. Murrow and the behavior o f Roy Cohn would finally seal his fate. None of these alone was 
the reason McCarthy fell. His fall would be a combination o f factors, and each of these would be 
linked to the end of his popular platform. The last year o f McCarthy’s dominance o f the Senate 
coincided with the end of the Korean War and the distancing in the minds of the public o f China 
becoming a Communist state.
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The case o f Annie Lee Moss, according to M. Stanton Evans, is that of "the quintessential 
McCarthy martyr, the most famous of all McCarthy cases.. .a case that says a lot about 
McCarthy, his critics and standard histories of the era.”334 Annie Lee Moss was a 
communications clerk in the Army Signal Corps. At the time of her appearance before the Senate 
Subcommittee, she was forty-eight years old. Moss came to McCarthy’s attention as an object 
lesson, he hoped, in the failure of loyalty boards.
Throughout the hearings, Senator Stuart Symington, Democrat from Missouri, waged a 
battle o f words and will with McCarthy, mainly over the ideal o f freedom of speech and 
demonstration. Symington “was disturbed by McCarthy’s stubborn insistence that federal 
employees had a higher duty to give him secret information than to obey the law.”335In response 
to McCarthy’s repeated summons of witnesses and demanding information, backed by loyalty 
boards, the McCarran act and a general climate o f unease, Symington opined that “If McCarthy 
is right, we haven’t got a good government, we haven’t got a bad government, we just don’t have 
any government at all.”336 Symington’s words foretold a change in opinion of McCarthy and 
McCarthyism.
Moss had been suspended from her job “when called to a previous meeting with 
McCarthy and branded a Communist. She was being brought in now, McCarthy said, as an 
example o f how the Army ‘coddled’ Communists.”337 Yet it would be the Moss case that, in the 
words o f Thomas Reeves, ‘blackened Cohn’s reputation as an investigator, and helped shatter 
Joe’s nationwide popularity.338’Cohn’s first mistake was relying on the word of Mary Markward.
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an FBI informant who had worked undercover in the Communist Party in Washington from 
1943-1949.339Markward, questioned as to whether or not she had personal confirmation of Moss, 
responded “no, I don’t specifically recall that I do know her as a person.”340 This uncertainty was 
only the beginning o f trouble for Cohn and McCarthy, who had learned of Markward “in the 
midst of his campaign against the Department o f the Army.”34lMcCarthy, once again, dove 
headfirst without careful consideration of evidence.
McCarthy, as preamble to Moss’s testimony, stated “this woman, Annie Lee Moss, who 
is handling the encoding, decoding, the routing of classified work, has been an active member of 
the Communist Party .”342Moss had however been cleared in the 1940s by her loyalty board, 
which determined that:
there were ‘no reasonable grounds’ to believe that she was disloyal, and she was 
permitted to retain her jo b .. .the same charges were resuscitated in 1951, when Moss, 
now an employee of the State Department o f the Army, was reinvestigated in the wake of 
a revision o f the army’s loyalty-security regulations.343
Andrea Friedman contends that “Moss became simultaneously a sign of the decline of 
McCarthyism and of the ascendency of the liberal racial order secured by anticommunism and 
enlightened white leadership.”344This is because Moss was part o f what Friedman called “the 
postwar global remapping and Cold War that emerged from it that ensured that domestic race 
relations would be critically enmeshed with international issues.”345During the hearing, on 
March 11, 1954, Robert Kennedy received word that the organizer supposedly behind Moss,
H erm an. 3 34
340 ibid
341Friedm an, S tra n g e  C a re e r ,  4 58
542 H erm an, 3 3 4
343Friedm an. S tra n g e  C a re e r , 44 8
344Friedm an, S tra n g e  C a re e r , 44 6
345Friedm an. S tran ge  C a re e r ,  45 2
101
Robert Hall, was in fact not the same Robert Hall. One was a white, Communist organizer and 
the other an African-American union organizer.
Cohn became flustered when informed of this discrepancy, and said "I don’t know that it 
was. Our information is that it was the same Rob H all.. .1 think that might be something we 
should look into and get some information on.,,346This was not the only bungling of the facts of 
the Moss case. Markward presented her against Moss within this climate, and did so having 
“kept no copies o f the records and reports she sent the FBI from 1943-1949.. .relied on her 
memory in her congressional appearances and as a woman deeply committed to the 
anticommunist crusade, she was hardly unbiased.”347 The implications of this would crystallize 
in the treatment Moss received by media figures, such as Edward R. Murrow, who would present 
her in such a state that Moss was reduced to victimhood.
For one thing, Murrow and other members of the media did not give McCarthy or Cohn 
credit for just how accomplished Moss was. Andrea Friedman writes that one theory holds:
Moss chose to collude in her portrayal as an ignorant victim. Whether or not she ever 
‘knowingly’ joined the Communist party, she knew more about it than she pretended. But 
Moss also knew a great deal about how to survive in the racist milieu o f the nation’s 
capital. She drew on well-learned lessons about racial etiquette as well as her political 
skills and community connections to respond successfully to this attack on her livelihood 
and her loyalty. WTiat appeared as stupidity was really an effective act of self- 
preservation and it is not in the least surprising that presumptions o f African-American 
incompetence shaped both the presentation and the reception of M oss’s testimony.348
The Moss case became a fiasco because of how rushed and contradictory the facts 
surrounding Moss, her supposed activities and even her identity, had been, because of Cohn’s 
demand for swift action. Senator Potter later wrote that:
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It was also brought out that there were three Annie Lee Mosses in Washington alone. If 
any one of the three women named Annie Lee Moss who lived in Washington at that time 
was a Communist, research should certainly have determined which one it was; the 
hearsay evidence of a corroborating witness could have been produced by bringing in the 
witness to confront the suspect. Then, if this Annie Lee who had been called in (or 
whichever one) might have been the true suspect, McCarthy would have had a case. As it 
was done, this woman who did appear had been suspended from her job-and what person 
at her low-level income can afford to be out of work for even one day?-and the pattern of 
her life had been permanently damaged.349
Yet, Moss may not have been completely innocent. The FBI had a long and detailed file
on her:
The Moss named by Markward had been a cafeteria employee, lived for a time with a 
Hattie Griffin, and received The Daily Worker-All this testified to by Markward on 
February 23. The Moss appearing before McCarthy, by her own account, had been a 
cafeteria worker, lived for a time with Hattie Griffin, and received The Daily Worker. As 
the authorities knew but the public didn’t, there was a long paper trail on Mrs. Moss and 
her security record with the federal government, first at the GAO and then with the 
Army. The trail would get even longer in August 1954-six months after Symington, 
Murror and others depicted Moss as a victim o f McCarthy’s slipshod methods-when the 
Army suspended her from duties. This action was based on a series of charges addressed 
to Moss that tracked closely with the intel provided by Scoop Jackson-but with one 
riveting addition: ‘you [Moss] are reported to have been given Communist Party 
membership book number 37269 for 1943.’350
The See It Now  broadcast of March 16, 1954, was made by Murrow to “be out of her 
element, and out of her depth.. .the picture guileless African-American servility.. .described in 
the press as ‘a humble, poverty stricken Negress.”351 Here, Murrow begins to editorialize, rather 
than, as he claimed ‘let the cameras and participants speak for themselves.’ Murrow’s voice 
intrudes as:
his sarcastic tones italicize the implausibility of so unintelligent a woman being a Soviet 
intelligence agent, ‘this woman, under suspicion because of charges made by Senator 
McCarthy and Roy Cohn, alleged to have examined and corrected secret and encoded 
overseas messages, attempted to read the uncoded words of her suspension notice.’352
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The historian Arthur Herman suggests that, for Cohn and McCarthy, what happened next 
was best explained by how:
political opponents turned the missteps of these two to their own advantage. Once again, 
the press and the American public opinion came to believe that the real problem was not 
the Army, Annie Lee Moss, and communism, but McCarthy ism. As in the Fred Fisher 
case, their misperception was reinforced by the television image, which presented itself 
as an ‘objective eye’ that cannot lie-but in fact misled Americans about the real Annie 
Lee Moss from that day to this.353
Cohn and McCarthy found themselves reeling. The Moss debacle-for debacle it was-had 
shown them as incompetent, impatient, selfish and vindictive. Murrow’s See It Now  “A Report 
on Senator Joseph R. McCarthy” had a profound impact on the viewing public, and prompted a 
response by McCarthy himself. The Report itself, is a mixture of fact and fiction which “works 
by exploiting expectations of the news report against expectations of the rhetorical accusation 
and uses the trope o f irony to lever itself from objectivity into argument.”354 In this way, Murrow 
went from “observer” to full critic and combatant.
For Cohn’s part in McCarthy’s fall, it was because how, once again he had erred in 
“acting out of the arrogance of McCarthy’s unrestricted power, ordered Schine’s commander to 
grant him privileged treatment. The uproar that followed led to the Army-McCarthy hearings.”3:o 
For Cohn, who had once stated “Steven’s is through as Secretary of the Army-we will wreck the 
Army”356 as punishment for how Schine had not gotten preferential treatment, it must have come 
as a deep shock. As the Army-McCarthy hearings officially began on April 22, 1954, the nation 
seemed divided into those who still believed in the Senator from Wisconsin, and those who, like
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Murrow, Eisenhower and many of McCarthy’s fellow Senators, had grown weary of feeling they 
must watch their step.
Arthur Herman makes the case that “on television, McCarthy’s skill in probing and 
exposing hostile witnesses made him look like a bully. His sardonic sense o f humor looked 
heavy-handed, his invocations o f the Communist threat stilted and out of place.”357 For a man 
who had been made by media, it would be the great mass media of the age which finally exposed 
him. For these hearings, McCarthy gave his usual chairmanship to Senator Mundt, since 
McCarthy was one o f the charged. In this case, he was accused, along with Roy Cohn, of 
inappropriate pressure on the Army to favor Schine. In return, McCarthy suggested that Fred 
Fisher, a young lawyer in the firm handling the prosecution o f his case, ought to be looked at for 
Communist involvement. The stage was set for an explosive finale to the most divisive years of 
the immediate post-War era.
Instead o f a case turning on Communists within the State Department, McCarthy had 
been led down the path o f self-satisfaction by Roy Cohn, exposing him as weak, unreliable and 
less interested in the truth than in personal glory. The Army had not forgotten what McCarthy 
had done to General Marshal, and this was, in some ways, a comeuppance for McCarthy. The 
combination o f Fisher, Cohn, McCarthy and Joseph N. Welch, lead counsel for the Army, was 
going to end the so-called McCarthy Era.
The crux of the matter is a backroom deal. This allowed Welch to proceed against 
McCarthy, and Cohn, who had, without telling McCarthy, arranged a deal where Cohn would not 
mention Fisher, who worked in Welch’s firm and had once belonged to the National Lawyers
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Guild, a listed affiliate of the Communist Party, if  Welch did not bring up Cohn's delinquent 
draft status through both World War Two and Korea.358 Writing at the time of McCarthy's 
downfall, James Rorty and Moshe Decter opin that:
McCarthy has often show signs o f a peculiar tendency to strike out wildly, unreasonably 
and unnecessarily, at real or imagined obstacles. Witness, for example, his gross insult to 
General Zwicker or his predictably unsuccessful diversionary attack on H. Struve Hensel, 
or his unexpected charges against a young Republican attorney, Frederick Fisher. These 
gratuitous attacks have cost him no little in public sympathy, and have made him 
unnecessary enemies. Such behavior is essentially visceral rather than rational, and thus it 
is not inconceivable that Senator McCarthy should unthinkingly destroy himself by a 
succession o f such maneuvers.359
Geoffrey Stone makes a salient point in terms o f those who wish to revise history to 
excuse all the actions o f Senator McCarthy:
To be sure, even the revisionists concede that McCarthy lied, bullied, abused, and 
humiliated innocent individuals. But what McCarthy contributed, they argue, was 
a fearless, stubborn, unyielding insistence on pursuing a profoundly important 
inquiry in the face o f Democratic obstructionism. Confronted by a concerted 
liberal effort to sweep under the carpet the Democratic failure to protect our 
national security at a time of great peril, McCarthy was an essential lightening 
rod. Even if he was wrong in the details, the argument goes, he was right in the 
big things. This is wrong, and dangerously so. The goal or preserving the nation’s 
security from unlawful espionage, sabotage, and foreign influence is certainly 
legitimate-indeed, compelling-and there were well-justified concerns about these 
matters during the Cold War. But a democracy is about means as well as ends. As 
the Supreme Court has consistently recognized in protecting our fundamental 
rights, not only must the ends be compelling, but the means must be necessary. It 
disserves our history to say that Joseph McCarthy meant well but merely went 
about it the wrong way. McCarthy’s methods violated the most fundamental 
norms and the most essential values of the American Constitutional system. There 
is simply no defending, or mitigating that reality.360
As McCarthy went through the Army hearings, it became obvious to all how sloppy his 
recent choices had been, and how harmful Roy Cohn’s vicious temper had been to McCarthy’s
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cause. Cohn had even approached Robert Broeck Stevens, Secretary of the Army, in order to aid 
Schine. Because o f this “the army charged it was pressured and threatened by McCarthy and 
C ohn.. .McCarthy countered that Stevens and his colleagues were protecting Communists and 
compromising Army security.”361
As Stone concedes, in reference to the Venona Decrypts362 “certainly, at the height of the 
Cold War, a small, highly disciplined cohort of Communists, working in secret with Agents of 
the Soviet Union, sought to harm the United States...a group of 200-400 people.”363McCarthy 
might have done well to have gone after these, whom the FBI certainly knew some o f and whose 
unmasking betrayed Hoover’s trust in McCarthy. Instead, McCarthy misrepresented the 
materials available to him in order to contribute to the cause Alfred Kohlberg had radicalized 
him on, the Loss of China.
In the majority o f cases, the State Department or Army was not only at the center of 
McCarthy’s investigations, but the policy in question had to do directly with the period of 
American involvement in China, or indirectly in policies McCarthy felt had adversely affected 
the outcome of Chiang-Kai-shek’s rule. So it was that McCarthy faced the hearings in April 
1954. For Fred Fisher, the first target o f McCarthy’s ire during the hearing meant to investigate 
McCarthy and Cohn’s meddling with private Schine, Welch had already vetted and dismissed 
him, having anticipated McCarthy’s response. “When he had been putting his staff together in 
preparation for the hearings, Welch had wanted to bring Fred Fisher, a young associate from his
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law firm, to Washington with him. But Fisher informed him he had once been active in the 
National Lawyers Guild and the Army’s advisers decided to drop him from the team.'’364 
Ultimately, it was not that McCarthy went after a Communist, an ex-Communist or an innocent 
man. It was his public conduct which finally gave the government and the American people a 
view of what McCarthy was really all about.
This was a view they did not particularly care for. During examination of Cohn and 
McCarthy, McCarthy interrupted Welch:
In view of Mr. Welch’s request that information be given once we know o f anyone who 
might be performing any work for the Communist party, I think we should tell him that 
he has in his law firm a young man who has been for a number of years a member o f an 
organization named by various committees, named by the attorney general, as I recall, as 
‘the legal bulwark of the Communist party. I have hesitated bringing that up but I have 
been rather bored with your phony requests to Mr. Cohn here that he personally get every 
Communists out of government before sundown. Therefore we will give you the 
information about the young man in your own organization.365
The crowd was stunned. Roy Cohn would later write that he was “horrified when 
McCarthy spoke out.”366 Despite Cohn’s pleas not to bring up Fisher, lest Welch bring up 
Cohn’s own lack o f a military record, McCarthy had persisted, and Welch obliged him with a 
blistering critique.
For once, it was not McCarthy’s accusations that seared itself into the public 
consciousness, but the victims reply. ‘Until this moment, Senator, I think I never really 
gauged your cruelty or your recklessness.. .So, Senator, I asked Fred to go back to 
Boston. Little did I dream you could be so reckless and cruel as to do an injury to that 
lad. I fear he shall always bear a scar needlessly inflicted by you. If it were in my power 
to forgive you for your reckless cruelty, I would do so. I like to think I am a gentle man 
but your forgiveness will have to come from someone other than m e.’ McCarthy again 
began to attack Welch’s associate. Welch then apologized to Cohn and turned back to
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McCarthy. ‘Let us not assassinate this lad any further, Senator. You have done enough. 
Have you no sense o f decency, sir? At long last? Have you left no sense of decency?'367
Neither McCarthy nor Cohn returned from this scathing rebuke. By June, McCarthy's 
poll numbers had gone from half the nation approving of him to just over a quarter.368The rest of 
the summer would be equally troubling for both men. The Army-McCarthy hearings ended on 
June 17, 1954. Shortly after, Welch was invited to the White House, where:
Eisenhower congratulated him on a job well done. Welch replied, if nothing else, the 
hearings had kept McCarthy on television for thirty-six days, long enough for the people 
to observe him up close. The President agreed, of course. That had been his strategy all 
along.369
Eisenhower, who had repeatedly refused to “get down in the gutter with that guy” as 
regards McCarthy, had instead given the Senator from Wisconsin a body blow-and completely 
within the limits o f the law. Vermont’s Ralph Flanders, a Republican Senator, had put forth a 
proposal “to deprive McCarthy o f his committee chairmanship.. .the day after the Fisher 
incident... but soon changed his strategy...to censure.”370 The content of Senate Measure 301, 
introduced July 30, 1954 was “Resolved, that the conduct of the Senator from Wisconsin, Mr. 
McCarthy, is contrary to senatorial tradition and tends to bring the Senate in disrepute, and such 
conduct is hereby condemned.”371 McCarthy was nearly without support.
As the summer of 1954 ended, Arthur Watkins, Republican Senator from Utah, oversaw 
the proceedings based on Flander’s movement for McCarthy’s censure. The members o f the 
committee “assumed that the Senate could punish prior conduct...and they were: encouragement 
of federal employees to break the law; receipt of classified documents from executive files;
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abuse o f Senate colleagues and abuse of General ZwickerA372 The hearings began August 31. 
1954. In late September, the first report of the Watkins committee was released and on 
November 8, 1954, the Senate began open debate on the report of W atkhrs findings.
On December 2, the resolution to censure Senator McCarthy was carried 67-22. The days 
o f McCarthy ruling the Senate were over. The end of Joseph McCarthy as an effective politician 
is not the end of his story. The important point to keep in mind is, as David Oshinksy writes:
it was the Democratic victory in 1954, not censure, that stripped McCarthy o f most of his 
power. He was no longer chairman o f Government Operations, which meant he no longer 
controlled the staff, the budget, or the targets to be probed. His position was that of an 
anti-Eisenhower Republican in a Democratic Congress. He was now a minority voice 
within a minority party-and a discredited voice at that.373
Joseph McCarthy spent the rest of his term, shunned by his fellow Senators, and in 
gradually declining health. The press no longer covered what he said, and his arguments on the 
Senate floor were often given to half empty chairs. McCarthy found himself unable to 
rehabilitate his public image and salvage his career. From the heights of accusations against the 
State Department in 1950, to being the most feared Senator in the land and chair o f his own 
committee in 1953, to being completely disgraced less than a year later, McCarthy had a 
meteoric rise and fall, swept along by social tides that, with the end o f the Korean War and 
flagging interest in Asian matters, had rendered his special entry into Communist infiltration-the 
Loss of China-moot to those with power and the public at large. He died on May 2, 1957, at the 
age o f forty-eight, at Bethesda, from what was officially labeled acute hepatitis, but which was 
whispered and generally acknowledged to be complications from years o f over-indulging in 
various spirits.
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Chapter Five: End of an Era 
The events and legacies of the McCarthy era are not limited to the four years in which 
McCarthy dominated the Senate, nor even to his lifetime. McCarthyism persisted beyond the 
days o f hunting Communists, and has become a byword to mean many things. As Murrow said, 
McCarthy only exploited an existing climate of fear. Ted Morgan, in noting that it existed well 
before McCarthy himself, defined McCarthyism in the same terms as the dictionary, in that it 
was, or is “the political practice o f publicizing accusations of disloyalty or subversion with 
insufficient regard to evidence.. .the use o f dubious methods of investigation in order to suppress 
evidence/'374 Senator Flanders, in starting his battle against McCarthy, had stated that
He is doing his best to shatter the party whose label he w ears.. .what is his party 
affiliation? One must conclude that his is a one-man party and that its name is 
McCarthyism. He dons his war paint, he goes into his war dance. He emits his war 
whoops. He goes forth to battle and proudly returns with the scalp o f a pink Army 
dentist.373
This was how McCarthy was viewed by many, not only at the end but throughout his 
career in the Senate. Edward A. Shills writes that a “legislative body which abandons its 
responsibilities to the populace which has elected it diverges from the rule of law as much as 
does a legislature which renounces its constitutional powers to the executive."376 In the Era of 
McCarthy, this delicate balance was hard to find, as, from fear or in hopes o f boosting a career, 
many politicians on both sides of the aisle and in every branch of government, seemed to become 
spectators to McCarthy’s roughshod behavior.
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McCarthy, while a bully, and in violation of both the rules of Senatorial conduct and 
etiquette, with methods that were more often than not absolutely deplorable, was later vindicated, 
in part, by the Venona Decrypts, which “combined with the Comintern documents, reveal that 
there existed an active communist underground in the United States composed of members of the 
CPUS A, who aided the Soviet intelligence service in many capacities."377 McCarthy was not the 
only person working toward rooting out such activity and persons. McCarthy failed in many 
ways.
Chiefly, McCarthy, as proven during the Army hearings, could not get out of his own 
way, and often stabbed everyone in the back, seemingly without understanding how they could 
possibly take offense. Alcohol is only a partial explanation. A monumental ego, a need to be in 
the spotlight and a desire to be viewed in the forefront o f the political game, get closer to 
explaining McCarthy.
McCarthyism, as understood here, was “bom out o f the dimly understood reality of 
America’s postwar global role. The postwar equation consisted of two inimical great powers, one 
o f which had a subversive group in the other’s midst, masquerading as a political party.”378 By 
the time o f his censure, “the Senate abjured ‘McCarthyism’ only insofar as it impinged upon 
institutional properties...for McCarthy’s outrages against individual rights and freedoms had 
been ignored."379 As Herbert Lehman, Democratic Senator from New York put it “we have 
condemned the individual but we have not yet repudiated the ‘ism '."380 He was correct. That 
very summer, in August 1954, the Communist Control Act had passed the Senate, with only two
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votes against it, an act which treated both party existence and membership as criminal 
institutions actions.
Joseph McCarthy is dead. A socio-political trend, existent prior to his arrival, but 
renewed and given broader attention, lives on in popular culture, as a buzzword, an insult and a 
category o f behavior. McCarthyism persists because it speaks to something in the American 
character and in human nature. It is petty. It is cruel. It offers, seemingly, a safe harbor.
Benjamin Franklin stated in 1755 to the Pennsylvania Assembly, "Those who would give up 
essential Liberty, to purchase a little temporary Safety, deserve neither Liberty nor Safety." It is 
true. When McCarthy came on the scene in 1950, he arrived at the height of fears over Soviet 
influence and Chinese conversion to Communism. This allowed the China Lobby to at least 
partially dictate which direction he pursued his investigations. What the China Lobby failed to 
understand was the tenuous nature of Chinese socio-political realities at the time.
Politically, withdrawal of American Military presence could accelerate the Sino-Soviet 
Clash that the experts expected and thus turn Mao into another Tito. Even recognition of 
Mao’s government was possible in such a situation. In January 1950, Aceheson 
articulated this policy and sketched a U.S. ‘defense perimeter’ in the Western Pacific that 
included neither Formosa nor Korea. Although essentially correct, such assessments 
ignored the antagonism the Communists had developed against the United States for 
aiding Chiang during the Chinese Civil War, as well as the American public’s continued 
emotional commitment to China. The old and emotional public commitment to ‘saving’ 
China led to a belief that this critical area had now been permanently Tost’ to the Soviets 
and that such a loss constituted a devastating defeat for the United States.381
McCarthy himself gets far too much attention for the era named after him. Not only were 
others more directly active in eradicating communism, but others abused the system just as much 
as he did. The House Un-American Activities Committee, not McCarthy, was responsible for the 
blacklist that affected Hollywood through the 1960s. McCarthy neither began nor contributed to
381 S to ler , 178
113
that, and had no interest in what movie folk were doing. His concern was political, and this is 
because his aims emerged from the China Lobby. President Truman, asked about McCarthy in 
the oral-history memoir Plain Speaking, said that
Oh yes, and Tve told you that he was just a no-good son of a bitch. And he was a 
coward. You take a damn demagogue, and he’s always a coward. And what you 
have to do with a coward, you have to fight him, and I did. I cussed him out every 
chance I got. And of course, it wasn’t just McCarthy. A fella like that couldn’t 
have got anywhere if he’d been fought from the very beginning. They didn’t do it, 
though. A man like that-it’s like a sickness. It isn’t going to disappear if you just 
ignore it. If that was the case, we wouldn’t need doctors, would we? And the 
others, the people who know a man like that is up to no good but who encourage 
him for strictly partisan reasons. People like Taft.. .he knew that what McCarthy 
was saying wasn’t true, that he was demagoguing the issue for all it was worth 
and he knew that was a dangerous thing to do because while I never did agree 
with him on much o f anything at all, I think he understood the history of this 
country. But he said, you know, that if  McCarthy didn’t have the facts in one 
case, he should keep on making accusations until he got to one where he could 
come up with the facts. Now that’s where the real danger comes from; it isn’t only 
the demagogues, it’s the ones who encourage them, who’ll do anything in the 
world to win an election. They’re just as bad.382
Truman’s response to McCarthy was not uncommon. Many did wish for him to go away 
and his actions caused frustration, even among his supporters. Truman thought of Eisenhower’s 
approach to McCarthy in stark terms, calling him “A coward...he hasn’t got any backbone at all, 
and I think he ought to be ashamed for what he did, but I don’t think there’s any shame in him at 
all.”383 What this demonstrates was how out of touch Truman was with the power McCarthy ever 
so briefly wielded.
The McCarthy Era was not as simple as a schoolyard fight with the local bully. It was far 
more complex, consisting of international and domestic tensions reaching back to the First World 
War. McCarthy’s tactics were incorrect. While some o f his targets were correct, the treatment
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they received should not be dismissed. Nor, however, should it be put entirely at McCarthy’s feet 
as the founder o f a movement. The movement simply adopted his name. It might be more 
appropriate to call it the State Department Failure Investigations Era, but the press likes less 
wordy terminology.
World War Two was a tremendous fight; one which while ‘‘popular” still had major 
dissenting factions. The post-war handling of the Asian world, the so-called “Loss of China” is 
impossible to separate from McCarthy, as it is the one thread which came up repeatedly in all his 
investigations. Each major target at the State Department or the Army, had ties to China, the 
Pacific Theater o f the Second World War, or to other actions in Asia, in the 1920s and 1930s. 
When those targets, such as Peress, failed to pass the test o f Chinese/Asian links, McCarthy had 
lost his thesis. McCarthy himself may have lost, but the trend of anti-Communism continues to 
the present, though far less vehemently.
Noted McCarthy critic Richard M. Fried wrote that “McCarthy was the symbol and 
exemplar o f McCarthyism, but not its single cause, and liberal opponents of the ‘ism’ often did 
themselves a disservice in allowing themselves to be transfixed by the man.”384 Fried also makes 
note of how, today, the battle has shifted to the push and pull between liberal and conservative, 
and “Liberalism has in some circles become the dreaded 4 L-word’.. .but while this may amount 
to a disturbing absence of comity in American politics, it does not represent a new McCarthy 
era.”385 In these ways, the wound of McCarthy and the true legacy of the era carries on, because 
the terms have come to have social meaning, grown over time and inflamed by passions and 
frustrations little understood historically by many of those who now use them.
384 Fried. M en, 313
385 Fried, N ightm are. 201
115
Even at the time, there was a lack o f clear understanding or, perhaps, an intended-or not- 
obfuscation o f facts. The example o f Arthur M iller’s play The Crucible is notable because of 
what it suggested and because of M iller’s own background. As Arthur Herman wrote:
With McCarthy gone, anti-Stalinist liberals found themselves at war again with the old 
Popular Front mentality, which the cold war had driven from the scene. A host of 
intellectuals and writers and ex-fellow travelers chafed under the restrictions about 
appearing pro-Soviet or too anti-American. Arthur Miller’s play The Crucible, which 
appeared to great critical acclaim in 1953, had epitomized their moral self-righteousness 
as well as their sense of injury. It equated the naming of former Stalinists to 
congressional committees with the trial and hanging of accused witches in Puritan Salem 
(although the fact that Miller could bring out such a play at the supposed height of the 
McCarthyite ‘terror’ seemed to undermine that claim.) Alarmed by this, Richard Rovere 
took time off from his forthcoming biography of McCarthy to write a penetrating critique 
of M iller’s work for the New Republic, entitled ‘Arthur Miller’s Conscience.’ He noted 
how ‘naming names’ had become the cardinal sin when discussing Communist 
associations, both past and present, rather than those associations themselves. ‘One could 
almost say that Miller’s sense of himself is the principle that holds ‘informing’ to be the 
ultimate in human wickedness’-as opposed, to, say, working for or supporting a political 
cause such as Hitler’s or Stalin’s (as Miller, a former Communist, had once done) As a 
liberal, Rovere believed in a ‘free play to the individual’s moral judgments’ and affirmed 
that ‘in recent years, Congressional committees have posed the single largest threat to this 
freedom.’ But as an anti-Communist, Rovere recognized that ‘not all informing is 
b ad .. .the question o f guilt is relevant.. .Those who would commit real crimes-a hit and 
run driver, or a spy or a th ie f need to be informed against, if the social order is to be 
preserved.386
The danger here is that the message and the messenger have become intertwined, and the 
guilt and bad behavior o f one stained the other to the point o f complete discredit. One legacy of
the McCarthy era has been silence. Such were the tragedies of the period that the response has
been incredibly disproportionate. The McCarthy era is over, yet its tremors reverberate to the
present. American politics have always been like this, and are unlikely to change. Perhaps it
should be McCarthy’s frequent target, Dean Acheson, who gets one of the last words. In a letter
to Truman in 1953, Acheson “lamented how McCarthy's ‘bastardization’ of American politics
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would actually weaken the fight against the ‘monolithic’ communists."387It is then fitting to say 
that McCarthy was both his own best friend and his own worst enemy, and that he created and 
destroyed himself within a framework of fear and panic that had a limited shelf life in the 
postwar era.
M cCarthy’s popularity gave him a legacy for which he never asked. It gave an era its 
name, one which could just as easily be called the Second Red Scare. More simply, it should be 
seen as what it was, a stage in the Cold War that began after the end of the Second World War, 
and was fought on misguided grounds by those who truly believed they were doing right. It 
should not, in either McCarthy or the China Lobby’s case, be viewed as heroic for their conduct. 
Instead, history must judge them on their actions and their results and those have proven a mixed 
bag o f half-truths and outright fabrications with no small measure o f hysteria.
Yet, there was a threat, and McCarthy was one of those who did battle with what he 
believed were his countries’ enemies. None can say what might have happened if McCarthy had 
instead gone after ensuring old age pensions, instead of fighting Communism, or if  he had taken 
a more tactful approach in rooting out those within the State Department who were Communist 
influenced against the best interests of the United States. The China Lobby chose poorly in 
selecting Joseph McCarthy as its front man in Washington.
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